THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

is movement towards a “purpose.” Moreover, he says that in this movement towards a
purpose, the subject itself is “unmoved” and thus “self-moving.” In this light, we might
define the subject or self, which is the notion, as a self-determined movement towards a
purpose.
In this passage, Hegel’s discussion of nature makes it clear that the categories of
“self-determination” and “purposive action” do not merely apply to the subject or self in
the traditional, narrow sense. In other words, these categories do not merely describe the
structure of human subjectivity. The rhetoric of the second sentence alludes to a complex
interpretation of the development of modern thought about nature. Hegel believes that
non-teleological conceptions of nature arose primarily as a rejection of a conception of
nature in terms of “external teleology” – i.e. in terms of the purposes or intentions of a
transcendent God who created nature. The rhetoric of this passage makes it clear that
Hegel rejects both the conception of nature as non-teleological and the conception of
nature in terms of external teleology. In contrast to both of these positions, Hegel sides
with Aristotle. He embraces a conception of nature that relies upon immanent teleology.
He holds that the “purposive activity” that constitutes reason exists in nature. All of this
should make it relatively clear that Hegel’s conception of the substance as subject – i.e.
his conception of the notion – applies to natural objects.
In the Science of Logic, Hegel uses the term “notion” to designate his conception
of the substance as subject. 37 The transition from the “Doctrine of Essence” to the
37 On my interpretation, Hegel’s ontology admits of many genuine things – i.e. of many substances
or notions. As I discuss in Chapter Two, these objects have differing degrees of reality or truth. While
there is one “truest” or “maximally real” object, there are nonetheless many objects. In other words, there
are many notions. Thus my interpretation runs contrary to the claim, made by some interpreters, that for
Hegel there is only one notion. For instance, in his article, “Hegels Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und
Darstellungsweise,” Hans Frierich Fulda makes the following claim: “Ebenso wie in Spinozas Philosophie
der Terminus ‘Substanz’ ein singulare tantum ist, ist es auch für Hegel der Terminus ‘Begriff’, sofern
24