THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

multiple (at least two) genuine objects exist. Section 2.3 then presents the problems that
arise when we try to conceive the structure of the object in terms of the relation between
unity and plurality. Section 3.1 considers various ways that the understanding tries to
resolve this paradox, drawing specifically on Hegel’s discussion of perception in the
Phenomenology of Spirit. Finally, Section 4 sketches Hegel’s solution to the problem. It
shows how he presents the teleological structure of the object as the only possible – or, at
least as far as he can see, the only available – means of explaining the relation between
unity and plurality.
2.1) The Unity and the Plurality of the Object Derived from the Structure of
Judgment
In forming a judgment, we seek to reflect or capture the structure of the object in
the structure of the judgment itself. Ideally, the structures of the judgment should
recapitulate the structures inherent in the object. In Hegelian terms, the activities that
structure the judgment should recapitulate the activities that structure the object. 163
163 One might object that many forms of judgment do not seek to reflect the structure of the object.
In the basic judgment, “the rose is red,” the subject-predicate structure of judgment reflects the traditional
substance-property analysis of the object. However, the relationship between a disjunctive or universal
judgment and the structure of the object is more difficult to see. Nonetheless, Hegel holds that these
judgments ultimately relate to the structure of the object. Thus, for instance, he holds that the universal
judgment expresses something about the structure of each individual object included in the judgment. In
other words, the universal judgment does not simply rest upon, or refer to, a class of objects as a collection
or set. Thus the judgment, “all dogs are mammals,” makes a claim about the structure of each dog taken
individually, not merely about the collection of things we refer to as dogs. With regards to disjunctive
judgments, the case for the relation between the structure of the judgment and the structure of the object is
somewhat more difficult to make. In this regard, it may be worth remembering our earlier remarks about
the nature of negative judgments. We said that negative judgments have a relationship to positive
judgments that can be defined as both parasitic and instrumental. Negative judgments are parasitic on
positive ones, for their meaning and possibility depends upon the meaning of the positive judgment. The
relationship is also instrumental, since negative judgments are only important insofar as they (a) negate a
debated positive judgment, or (b) bring us closer to forming a true positive judgment. At the very least,
Hegel would argue that disjunctive judgments have an instrumental relationship to apodictic notional
judgments, the highest form of judgment he discusses.
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