THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

(identity). In terms of this basic purpose, we can rank different kinds of things in terms
of (1) the degree of unity they are able to achieve as well as (2) the degree of complexity
they are able to maintain within that unity. The second point is important. Genuine
things do not seek a pure unity. 90 Instead, each thing strives to integrate the richest
possible complexity within its form of unity.
One kind of thing is truer than another kind of thing if it contains a greater degree
of complexity within a more developed form of unity. The degree of development in the
form of unity depends upon (2a) the degree to which the manifold facets integrated in the
unity depend upon one another for their nature, proper function, and persistent existence,
and (2b) the degree to which the entity has a unified awareness of itself and its
environment, an awareness that allows it to control and transform its environment and to
develop itself in accordance with changing conditions. Some examples should help to
illustrate these points. Consider, for instance, a specimen of gold, an oak tree, and a
chimpanzee. 91
In Hegelian terms, an oak tree is truer than a specimen of gold. In comparison
with a specimen of gold, an oak tree contains a greater degree of complexity within a
90 This point distinguishes Hegel’s conception of the scale of truth from the scale of being as
conceived in the Neo-Platonic tradition. While the Neo-Platonic scale of being ascends towards pure unity,
Hegel’s scale of truth ascends towards objects that contain the most developed form of unity in the greatest
possible degree of complexity. In this regard, Hegel’s conception of perfection – of that which is most true
– might be compared with the Leibnizian claim that God’s perfection entails the creation of the greatest
diversity of effects with the simplest of means. (See Discourse on Metaphysics, paragraph V) The degree
of perfection consists neither in the degree of simplicity nor in the degree of diversity, but rather it consists
in the greatest possible distance between the degree of simplicity and the degree of diversity. Of course for
Leibniz, God’s perfection consists in the creation of the greatest diversity of ends through the fewest
possible means. Hegel reverses the order, holding that perfection consists in employing the greatest
diversity of means for a single, unified end. On Hegel’s view, the truest object – world history – takes the
manifold diversity that exists and transforms it into a process directed towards a single end.
91 These examples and the terms used to describe them are mine, not Hegel’s. Nonetheless, I
believe they sufficiently illustrate Hegel’s general conception of what it means to say that some kinds of
things are truer than other kinds of things.
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