THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

conditions required for each to be adequately realized (realized in a manner fully
consistent with the essential character of a self-determined will). In each instance
a consideration of those conditions will reveal how a lower form falls short of
being completely adequate to the concept of self-determination and thus points
out the necessity of the configuration immediately above it in the hierarchy. 298
Neuhouser sees “self-determination” as the central concept and starting point for Hegel’s
political philosophy. The dialectical movement of the Philosophy of Right progresses by
uncovering the necessary conditions for the adequate realization of self-determination.
The transition from one dialectical stage to the next occurs either because (a) the earlier
stage is not sufficient to ensure the realization of self-determination, or (b) because the
full realization of the earlier stage itself presupposes some further condition or stage. 299
Since the justification for the later stages derives from their essential role in the
realization of the earlier ones, it obviously follows that these later stages retain the values
and institutions presented in the earlier ones. Neuhouser makes this point in his
discussion of the transition from “Morality” to “Sittlichkeit.” In order to understand this
transition, Neuhouser argues, we must grasp how the institutions of Sittlichkeit “help to
298 Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, p. 27. On Neuhouser’s view, “X is a higher dialectical
stage than Y” means (1) that X is richer or more concrete than Y, and (2) that Y depends upon X for its
actualization. Stating the second criterion in a different form, we can say that X is higher than Y means
that X presents the necessary conditions for Y.
299 Neuhouser distinguishes between the transcendental and the teleological aspects of Hegel’s
dialectical procedure (pp. 290-291). At some points, Hegel shows how some stage X presents the
necessary conditions for another stage Y. In such cases he follows a transcendental strategy. At other
times, Neuhouser argues, Hegel shows how the consistent instantiation of Y and self-determination, the
ultimate goal of Hegel’s practical philosophy, requires some further stage X. Neuhouser calls this second
strategy a “teleological strategy.” However, it seems more accurate to see this second option as a variant
on the transcendental strategy. Neuhouser’s “teleological arguments” simply ask for the necessary
conditions for the coherent instantiation of some stage Y and self-determination. Consider, for instance,
Neuhouser’s account of the transition from “Abstract Right” to “Morality” as a teleological argument. He
says: “The transition from ‘Abstract Right’ to ‘Morality’ is of a teleological type, since moral subjectivity
is deduced not, strictly speaking, as a condition of the possibility of its predecessor but as a configuration of
the will that must supplement personhood in order for personal freedom to be actualized in a manner
consistent with the initially posited ideal (telos) of the will’s complete self-determination” (p. 291). In
other words, “Abstract Right” provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for the realization of
“personal freedom,” and “morality” presents further necessary conditions.
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