THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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Hegel rejects both alternatives, and thus he concludes that the “I” cannot be fully abstracted from its different representations. This means that the “I” itself presents the unity of identity and difference. In order to grasp the “I” we must grasp the sense in which the “I” is the same “I” in all of its representations, and we must, at the same time, grasp the sense in which the “I” is different in its essential relation to each of the particular representations it has. 261 In this sense, the “I” has the same structure as the absolute, a structure that Hegel describes as follows: “But the absolute itself is therefore the identity of identity and difference; opposition and unity are, at the same time, in it.” 262 Yet again we see the key words, “at the same time” or “zugleich.” The absolute includes both opposition and unity, both identity and difference. In order to avoid contradictions, we must grasp these 261 This basic point about the structure of the “I” can be seen in Hegel’s discussion of “Sense- Certainty,” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel says: “Among the countless differences cropping up here we find in every case that the crucial one is that, in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two ‘Thises’, one ‘This’ as ‘I’, and the other ‘This’ as object. When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time mediated: I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the ‘I’” (p. 59). Hegel goes on to explain this complex point in terms of the structure of the “here” and the “now.” Both the here and the now have a complex structure. On the one hand, the terms “here” and “now” always refer to something that is the same. Qua now, or in its nowness, each now is the same. However, the content of each now is different. Moreover, as Hegel argues here, the relation between the identity and the difference in the now is mediated, which is to say these two aspects are essentially related, and this essential relation constitutes the two aspects related. In other words, we can’t make sense of a now without some content. Now it must be night or day. Or, here there must be a tree or a house. At the same time, we can’t make sense of the content without thinking of its relation to the now. We can’t think day or night without thinking of the possibility of their existing – i.e. of their being now. Similarly, we can’t conceive the tree or the house without the possibility of their being here. Hegel demonstrates these two essentially related aspects by showing how the meaning of the terms “now” and “here” vacillate between expressing that which is always the same – the now in its nowness and the here in its hereness – and expressing that which is always different – night and day, tree and house. In order to grasp the basic structure of the “here” or the “now,” we must grasp it as the unity or mediation of these two aspects. As expressed in the passage quoted above, the structure of the here and the now present simple examples of the relation between the “I” and its object. The “I” is the form of the now and the here. The “I” is basic nowness of the now and the hereness of the here. However, in the same way that the here and the now only exist in relation to the specific and changing content that exists here and now, so also the “I” only exists in relation to the object that provides the content for its form. 262 Werke, 2. P. 97. 247
apparently contradictory moments in their essential relation to one another. We must grasp them at the same time. 6) Glauben und Wissen: Apperception as Essentially Active, Rule-Governed, and Relational In Glauben und Wissen Hegel criticizes Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi for what he sees as their common failure to overcome the opposition between faith and knowledge. 263 This epistemic statement of the problem points towards a more fundamental ontological problem, towards the paradox inherent in the relationship between the infinite and the finite, and ultimately towards the problem of the unity of identity and difference. 264 It is in this essay that Hegel specifically discusses Jacobi’s work, Über das Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen. In this essay Hegel also presents an interpretation of Kant that appears to borrow heavily from the categories developed by Jacobi. Thus, for instance, Hegel presents the relation between the pure identity of the “I think” and the manifold of intuition in terms that directly follow Jacobi’s critique of Kant. Hegel says: This manner of formal identity has a non-mediated [unmittelbar] infinite difference against or next to it, and it is supposed to coalesce with this difference in some incomprehensible way. From this situation we have on one side the “I” 263 In light of the strong differences between Jacobi’s criticism of reason, on the one hand, and Kant and Fichte’s programmatic endorsement of reason, on the other hand, this comparison of the three philosophers is clearly intended as a sharp rebuke of the latter two. Hegel claims that despite Kant and Fichte’s stated allegiance to reason and Enlightenment, their philosophical systems ultimately remain on the same level of that as Jacobi. In this vein Hegel makes the highly polemical claim that the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi make reason “once again into the maid of faith” (Werke 2, p. 288). While Jacobi would accept this characterization of his work, Kant and Fichte would find it deeply insulting. 264 In this light it is worth remembering Hegel’s remark, in the Differenzschrift, that the opposition between identity and difference expresses itself in the opposition between faith and knowledge (see footnote 2). In other words, the misconception of the relation between identity and difference leads to the misconception of the relation between faith and reason. 248
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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENC
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Michael Eugene Morris in terms of c
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks………
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7) Essay on Natural Right: The Unit
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interpret these issues as an expres
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even “naively metaphysical.” 4
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immanent metaphysics. Insofar as He
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consciousness.” 13 Thus the Scien
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all genuine objects consist in some
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This section does not explain the m
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transitions from abstract right to
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The second moment of the will is th
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self as “pure infinity,” thus d
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will and the third part of the book
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3.2) The Notion: Substance as Subje
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is movement towards a “purpose.
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Therefore he argues we must replace
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judgment of the plant. The illustra
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the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes t
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colorful - but ultimately justified
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constituted in terms of the same ba
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provides the basic categories in te
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3.5) The “I” as Instantiation o
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of the self are genuine moments rat
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moments of the will. With regard to
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Before examining these issues, we s
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the third moment of the will, the m
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks CHAPTER TW
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certain traditional conceptions of
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conception that considers a thing a
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thing is “nothing.” Thus Bradle
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crucial ways. 71 Moreover, we are n
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From this brief survey, the followi
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If we can think of the thing’s qu
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and concrete, each object strives t
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different ways as his philosophy pr
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insists that truth comes in degrees
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necessary, therefore, if we use the
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Hegel believes that truth and falsi
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Hegel even insists that physical an
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2.4) The Degrees of Truth Ascribed
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more developed form of unity. A spe
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instantiated. The tree has thousand
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proximate truth of that from which
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higher kinds. The most general univ
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the solution. The next highest kind
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In the most general and abstract te
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The unity of identity and differenc
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of identity and difference, reason
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evident in the processes of life. M
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In accordance with the interpretati
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Third, we have the moment that unit
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category of ontology helps to make
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CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF GENUINE
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Our discussion of these phenomena s
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Two will briefly consider Hegel sol
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2.2) Difference, Identity, and Unit
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The second and third moments distin
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The moments of identity and differe
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The structure of judgment presents
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is red.” In this judgment, the su
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“identity” and “connection.
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interpretation assumes that “is
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judgments present the most develope
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emains unclear. However, it should
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speculation grasps the unity that u
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that is also a connecting. Thus jud
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Judgment obviously involves two men
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option presents judgment as the res
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5.4) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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we must carefully distinguish betwe
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all into the abyss of vacuity witho
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divides and articulates that which,
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5.5) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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as (b) a process that starts with u
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The essential requirement for the s
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Through this progress [which is als
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inhere in this substance. Thus we c
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conversely, the understanding const
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1) Introduction CHAPTER FOUR THE NA
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consider judgment as a series of ac
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Each judgment contains two obvious
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then there would be no basis for di
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In order to grasp the structure of
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In order to grasp the structure of
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corresponds to the way the object i
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contradicts it, this is to be recog
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make between different features of
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Here Hegel considers a conception o
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determining the exact nature of the
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moment of analysis. Moreover, we sa
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conception of the substance as subj
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says: “Only this self-restoring s
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elation to the unity that constitut
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instantiate their telos fully. Or,
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inextricably entwined with its othe
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epresentation to all objects. Moreo
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telos, and the telos can only be co
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experience in which certain things
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In this passage, Hegel speaks of th
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make it “an independent object”
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Page 221 and 222: 5.8) No Discrete Plurality Given Pr
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Page 235 and 236: 3) Jacobi: The Mysterious Unity of
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point even more forcefully in his d
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Hegel’s view, the contradictions
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which the individual participates,
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argument, and on the basis of this
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HEGEL'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY Werke. F
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Fulda, Hans Friedrich. (1978) “He
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Neuhouser, Frederick. (2000) Founda
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