THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

speculation grasps the unity that underlies these distinctions. Additionally, reflection or
the understanding construes the world in static terms, while reason or speculation
construes the world in dynamic terms. 130 Hegel sees reflection or the understanding as an
essential but limited mode of thought that all too often usurps the proper role of
speculation. 131 When thought gives priority to the understanding, various distortions and
contradictions arise.
Reflection, as distinct from speculation, conceives absolute identity in terms of
“two propositions, one containing the identity, the other dichotomy.” It construes
absolute identity in terms of the propositions: “A = A” and “A ≠ A.” Or, in terms of the
propositions: “A = A” and “A = not-A.” As Hegel notes, the second proposition
“contradicts the first.” Moreover, the second proposition, considered by itself, states a
contradiction. However, in evaluating Hegel’s point, we must carefully note that this
contradiction represents the structure of judgment as conceived by reflection or the
understanding. It represents the means by which reflection grasps absolute identity or the
structure of judgment. Thus it does not express the structure of judgment as conceived by
130 In paragraph 80 of the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel describes the understanding as a mode of
thought that draws distinctions, one that conceives the world in discrete and static terms. He says:
“Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another: every
such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own.” By contrast, Hegel describes
reason or speculation as a mode of thought that grasps the world as a dynamic unity. He says: “The
Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their
opposition – the affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition” (Paragraph
82). Here the emphasis on unity is clear. Hegel expresses the dynamic nature of reason when he speaks of
the “disintegration” and “transition” captured by reason.
131 In the Encyclopedia Logic, after discussing the defects that result from thought’s exclusive
reliance upon the understanding or reflection, Hegel goes on to describe the merits of that mode of thought.
He says: “It must be added, however, that the merit and rights of the mere Understanding should
unhesitatingly be admitted. And that merit lies in the fact that apart from Understanding there is no fixity
or accuracy in the region of theory or practice. Thus, in theory, knowledge begins by apprehending
existing objects in their specific differences. In the study of nature, for example, we distinguish matters,
forces, genera, and the like, and stereotype each in its isolation. Thought is here acting in its analytic
capacity” (Paragraph 80A). In regards to Hegel’s defense of the importance of analytic thought, see
Section 7.3.1 – 7.3.6 of this chapter.
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