THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

then there would be no basis for distinguishing the features that comprise the object from
the rest of the world, and by definition these features would not constitute a genuine
object.
If we assume that there is more than one genuine object, then there must also be a
sense in which each genuine object is many. 165 In other words, there must be a sense in
which all objects include a manifold of parts, properties, or features. This claim may
seem less obvious than the first. However, if objects in the world did not contain a
manifold of parts, properties, or features, then these objects would be simple unities – i.e.
unities without any internal distinction or differentiation. If the objects in the world were
pure or simple unities, then there would be no difference between the various objects in
the world. 166 This, however, is a contradiction. If there is more than one object in the
this unity must be inherent in the object, and (2) that this unity derives from an entelechy – i.e. from an
active principle.
165 The claim “the object is many” sounds awkward, given the disagreement between the verb and
the predicate. At this point, the suspicion might arise that Hegel’s “contradictions” simply arise from such
awkward and ultimately incorrect ways of speaking. Thus, for instance, one might argue that he should say
that the object includes a plurality of features, or that the object possesses many properties, or, finally, that
the object contains a manifold. Hegel would argue, however, that until we have a very clear sense of what
it means to say that an object includes, possesses, or contains, a plurality, this manner of speaking simply
covers up the problem with common phrases and loose metaphors. The verbs “contain” and “include” both
have an obvious spatial sense. However, Hegel would argue that spatial containment or inclusion is not
sufficient to determine the unity of genuine objects, since spatial relations are infinitely divisible and allow
for an infinite variety of different possible divisions. In other words, space, as such, does not contain any
inherent individuating principles.
166 Leibniz presents a similar argument in Monadology. In paragraphs one through seven of the
Monadology, Leibniz argues for the simplicity of the monad, and he considers the implications that follow
from this simplicity. In paragraphs eight through thirteen, he argues that plurality must exist in the monad.
Here Leibniz presents two basic kinds of arguments to show that plurality must be contained in the monad.
First, he presents two arguments from change. Second, he presents an argument from the assumption that
multiple monads exist and from the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. In paragraph eight, Leibniz
begins the argument by stating: “monads must have some qualities.” In other words, monads must have
properties or some plurality within them. He argues: “if monads had no qualities, they would be
indiscernible from one another.” However, he continues, it is impossible for two objects to be
indiscernible. In paragraph nine, he says: “It is also necessary that each monad be different from each
other. For there are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not
possible to discover an internal difference.” So if there are multiple genuine objects, these objects must
each possess various properties. If they did not, they would be simple; if they were simple, they would be
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