THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

the unity expressed by the copula, there must be another sense in which the object
presents a unity.
Here we see the moment of difference and the moment of identity. Or, stated in
terms more appropriate for dealing with the structure of the object, we see the moment of
plurality and the moment of unity. Before considering the necessity of the third moment,
the moment that unities unity and plurality, it is worth noting that we can also establish
the necessity of these two moments if we assume the existence of multiple (at least two)
genuine objects. In other words, we can establish the necessity of these two moments
without considering the relation between the object and the structure of judgment, and
without assuming that each moment of the judgment reflects some genuine aspect of the
object.
2.2) The Unity and the Plurality of the Object Derived from the Assumption of
Multiple Genuine Objects
Assume that there are multiple (at least two) genuine objects in the universe.
Insofar as an object is genuine, it must have some principle of unity. There must be some
sense in which it is one. 164 If there were not some sense in which the object was one,
164 This is a common enough claim, one that is often emphasized in the philosophical traditions
that are important for Hegel. For instance, Plotinus says: “It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings”
(The Enneads, 535). Like Hegel, Plotinus focuses on the manner in which the relationship between unity
and plurality constitutes the object. Plotinus says: “Deprived of unity, a thing ceases to be what it is called:
no army unless as a unity: a chorus, a flock, must be one thing” (Ibid, 535). Here we see things constituted
by unity that somehow integrates or draws together a plurality. Further, Plotinus agrees with Hegel that
being (or truth) has many degrees, and that these degrees are determined by the nature of unity. Thus
Plotinus says: “the less or more the degree of the being, the less or more the unity” (Ibid, 536). Leibniz also
claims that a genuine thing must be constituted by an inherent principle of unity. He says: “I don’t see how
one can have real entities and substances without having true unities. Arbitrary unities, which
mathematicians use, are not relevant here; they are applicable even to apparent entities, such as all entities
by aggregation are, for example, a flock or an army, whose unity derives from thought. The same holds for
any aggregate, since you will find nothing that is truly one if you take away the entelechy” (“From the
Letters to De Volder. In G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, 175.) Like Hegel, Leibniz argues (1) that
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