THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

that overcome the rigid distinction between the desires of private persons and the
institutions, practices, and social relations intended to fulfill these desires. He says:
If the state is confused with civil society, and if its specific end is laid down as the
security and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interests of the
individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and it follows
that membership in the state is something optional. But the state’s relation to the
individual is quite different from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is
only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine
individuality, and an ethical life. Unification pure and simple is the true content
and aim of the individual, and the individual’s destiny is the living of a universal
life. His further particular satisfaction, activity, and mode of conduct have this
substantive and universally valid life as their starting point and their result. 339
In this passage Hegel makes a number of important points. First, he makes it clear that
the state does not merely present a necessary condition for the “security and protection of
property and personal freedom.” The state doesn’t simply support or ground civil
society, but rather it provides a new conception of social reality. Thus the transition from
“Civil Society” to the “State” cannot be understood in terms of the structure of a
transcendental argument. Second, Hegel directly contrasts the standpoint of civil society
with the standpoint of the state. He points out that from the standpoint of the state, “the
interests of individuals” do not serve as the “ultimate end of their association.” Thus he
rejects the merely instrumental conception of social institutions and practices that
grounds civil society.
Third, Hegel claims that we cannot conceive the individual and her interests in
isolation from the social practices, institutions, and associations that comprise the state.
This claim repudiates the essential dichotomy that structures civil society. Hegel
conceives the state as the fundamental unity that grounds the distinction between the
desires and aims of the individual, on the one hand, and the institutions and practices in
339 Philosophy of Right, paragraph 258.
301