THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

moments. There is no third moment of judgment, one that presents a challenge, paradox,
or contradiction.
The options considered above present two interpretations of judgment that allow
for the complete disambiguation of the two rules that constitute a judgment. In both
cases, we can clarify the rules that constitute the judgment in terms of the manner in
which the world is immediately given to us – i.e. in terms of the immediate unity or the
discrete plurality of the world as it is given priori to judgment. According to the first
conception of judgment, the world presents us with a discrete or differentiated plurality,
and the identity and difference of judgment stem from two different ways of synthesizing
that which is discretely given. According to the second alternative, the world presents
itself to us as a unity, and the two principles of judgment present two ways of analyzing
the world.
On the surface, judgment includes both identity and difference: it consists in an
act of synthesis and an act of analysis. The two conceptions of judgment presented so far
reduce these two distinct kinds of acts to one fundamental kind. On the first view, all
judgment – and thus all mental activity – ultimately consists in synthesis. The world is
given as discrete, as fully analyzed, and the mind simply synthesizes. The distinction in
judgment, the apparent result of an act of analysis, merely results from a less adequate or
lower level synthesis. On the second view, all judgment consists in analysis, and the
apparent synthesis involved in judgment stems from a less developed analysis.
synthesis, while on the second account, the apparent act of synthesis proves to be a less thoroughgoing
analysis.
131