THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

The moments of identity and difference are not sufficient to distinguish genuine
change from that which is merely apparent. The identity of that which persists and the
difference of the change do not sufficiently explain the nature of change as distinct from
annihilation and creation. Thus our analysis of change requires a third moment, the
moment of unity. In order to distinguish genuine change from persistence, annihilation,
and creation, we must grasp the essential relation that unites P to S1 and S2 respectively.
We must grasp the essential relation that prevents us from treating P, S1, and S2 as three
distinct things.
In terms of our example, we must grasp the meaning of the copula in the claims,
“the water is cold” and the “water is warm.” On the one hand, the copula obviously
doesn’t express strict identity, for that would lead to the following contradictory claims 1)
water = cold, and (2) water = warm, and (3) warm ≠ cold. On the other hand, the copula
doesn’t merely express the “existing togetherness” of two distinct things, as though the
phrase, “the water is cold,” simply meant, “there is water, and there is coldness, and they
are together.” So in order to grasp change, we must grasp some form of unity that is less
than strict identity but greater than a mere “existing togetherness” of two distinct
things. 111 We must, in other words, grasp what it means to say that warmth is a property
111 In this context, it is important to recall a few of the claims made in Section Four of Chapter
Two. In this Appendix we examined Hegel’s claims (1) that philosophies sole purpose is to determine the
different modes or phases of unity; (2) that every “peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things,
inorganic and living, depends solely on the different modes of this unity;” and finally (3) that neither strict
identity nor mere aggregation plays an important in role in a proper conception of reality. In other words,
the task of philosophy is to determine the various modes of unity that are greater – i.e. more genuinely
unified – that mere aggregation but less than strict identity. Moreover, as philosophy considers these
various forms of unity, it traces the differences between the various kinds of natural objects. In other
words, each phase or mode of unity finds expression in some kind of natural (or spiritual) object. With
regards to the different modes of unity, see the discussion of the meanings of the copula in Section 4.2 of
this chapter.
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