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3) Jacobi: The Mysterious Unity of Unity and Plurality<br />

In his 1801 essay, Über das Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu<br />

Verstande zu bringen, Jacobi examines the relationship between the understanding and<br />

sensibility as presented in Kant’s philosophy. Jacobi attempts to highlight what he sees<br />

as the problematic and ultimately mysterious nature of this relationship. As the essay<br />

progresses, Jacobi often replaces the term “understanding” with the term “unity.” He<br />

likewise replaces the term “sensibility” with “plurality” (Mannigfaltige). Thus he often<br />

discusses the problem about the relation between understanding and sensibility in terms<br />

of a more general problem about the relationship between unity and plurality. In proto-<br />

Hegelian fashion, he argues that if we begin by conceiving unity and plurality as fully<br />

distinct, then we will not be able to explain their relation. Therefore, he argues, we must<br />

begin with the attempt to grasp their essential unity. However, as we shall see, Jacobi<br />

ultimately draws the very un-Hegelian conclusion that this deeper unity is mysterious and<br />

beyond the grasp of human reason.<br />

In the following passage, Jacobi speaks of the problematic relation between unity<br />

and plurality, a problematic relation that has troubled him for eighteen long years,<br />

presumably since he first read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. He says:<br />

For eighteen long years I have sought to comprehend how you conceive<br />

(vorstellen) a plurality, to which unity comes, and a unity, to which plurality<br />

comes, or even how you think this pure giveness (Begebenheit) in any way. Each<br />

year it becomes more incomprehensible to me. If you are not capable of this, but<br />

rather you assume (setzen) that both plurality and unity presuppose one another in<br />

the same manner, that both determine one another in the same manner, and that<br />

they can only be thought in one another and at the same time (zugleich), as the<br />

substantial forms of all thought and being: what will then become of your whole<br />

apriori? 232<br />

232 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Werke, Dritter Band. Edited by Friedrich Roth and Friedrich<br />

Köppen. Berlin, Berliner Buchdienst. (2001). Pp. 112-3.<br />

228

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