THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

In his doctrine of the notion (Begriff), Hegel develops this thesis about the
isomorphism of the categories of thought and reality, and he also presents his criticism of
various pre-Kantian conceptions of substance. 16 The Aristotelian conception of
substance and the Leibnizian doctrine of the monad figure prominently in Hegel’s
development of the notion. Like both philosophers, Hegel insists that final causality
plays an essential role in the constitutive structure of all genuine objects. Like Leibniz,
he also insists that all genuine objects must be grasped in terms of categories normally
associated with human consciousness. Leibniz insists that all genuine objects, all monads
as he calls them, must be constituted in terms of perception and appetition, functions
normally associated exclusively with consciousness or mind. Similarly, Hegel holds that
16 In Wahrheit aus dem Begriff and Ontologie und Relation, Rolf-Peter Horstmann presents an
interpretation of Hegel that places great emphasis on the doctrine of the notion or the “Begriff.” In many
ways, my interpretation follows a line quite similar to the one laid down by Horstmann. Like Horstmann, I
argue that (1) Hegel’s philosophy should be interpreted as a kind of immanent metaphysics; that (2) Hegel
critiques various traditional conceptions of substance; that (3) Hegel presents the object qua notion as an
alternative to these traditional doctrines of substance; that (4) both Hegel’s critique of the traditional
doctrines of substance and his development of the notion rest largely upon his conception of judgment and
the object as the relation between unity and difference; and that (5) Hegel’s conception of the notion
explains the object in terms of categories drawn from the teleological structure of organisms and the basic
relational structures that characterize subjectivity. These five central theses of Horstmann’s interpretation
can be gleaned from the following two passages from Wahrheit aus dem Begriff. First: “Hegel’s Kritik an
der traditionallen Metaphysik hat eine gewichtige Basis in seiner Überzeugung, daß man mit ihren Mitteln
nicht in der Lage ist, eine akzeptable Theorie dessen, was ein Objekt in Wahrheit ist, vorzulegen. Dies
deshalb, weil sie auf Grund ihres ,,unreflektierten’’ Urteilsverständnis fassen kann und andererseits unfähig
ist, eine ,,organologische’’ Konzeption des Objekts sachlich zu decken” (p. 59). And second: “Objekt in
Wahrheit erkennen, heißt, ihren Begriff erkennen, denn das, was das Objekt in Wahrheit ist, ist sein
Begriff. Außerdem ist nur das in Wahrheit Objekt, was man nicht als Mechanismus denken muß, sondern
was organologisch als Einheit inkompatibler Bestimmungen oder als organismusartig gedacht werden
kann” (p. 55). My interpretation differs from Horstmanns in one crucial respect. Horstmann claims that on
Hegel’s view, there is only one genuine or true object (see pp. 75 – 81). Among other things, this claim
fails to account for Hegel’s view that there are degrees of reality and truth (See Chapter Two). While there
is one object that is most true or most real – i.e. one object in which the basic structures of the notion are
fully articulated, developed, or realized – there are many other kinds of “genuine” objects according to
Hegel’s ontology. Additionally, I would argue that Horstmann’s interpretation fails to take account of the
way that the basic structures of teleology can be embedded in inorganic objects. Similarly, it fails to take
account of the way that the basic structures of subjectivity can be embedded in merely natural – which is to
say non-mental – objects.
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