THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

If we can think of the thing’s qualities and the law of their connection as standing
to one another in the same way as the detailed series of acts embodying a
subjective interest of our own, and the interest itself which by its unity confers a
felt unity on the series, we can in principle comprehend how the many qualities
belong to the one thing. 77
The unity of experience, determined by the unity of the purpose that structures
consciousness, provides an analogy in terms of which we can understand the structure of
all genuine objects. Thus in Hegelian terms, we must construe the substance as a subject.
Specifically, we must construe substance in terms of the categories of representation and
purposive action.
Both Bradley and Taylor agree (1) that one central problems of metaphysics
concerns the relationship between unity and plurality or what Hegel describes as the unity
of identity and difference; (2) that our attempt to conceive the nature of genuine objects
must resolve this problem by explaining the intimate relation between unity and plurality,
the sense in which some non-aggregate or genuine unity can include a kind of plurality;
(3) that the mental phenomena of representation and purposive action provide a crucial
example of a non-aggregate unity that includes plurality; and (4) therefore that all
genuine objects or substances must be conceived in terms of the categories of
representation and purposive action. Thus the philosophical systems of Bradley and
Taylor present extended arguments about the nature of substance, arguments that
recapitulate crucial Hegelian insights. While Bradley acknowledges his debt to Hegel,
Taylor singles out Leibniz as his source of inspiration on this matter. The respective
intellectual debts of Bradley and Taylor highlight the affinities between the philosophical
systems of Leibniz and Hegel, affinities that are too often overlooked.
77 Elements of Metaphysics, p. 138.
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