THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Through this progress [which is also a kind of regress], then, the beginning losses
the one-sidedness which attaches to it as something simply immediate and
abstract; it becomes something mediate, and hence the line of the scientific
advance becomes a circle. It also follows that because that which forms the
beginning is [at the beginning] still undeveloped, devoid of content, it is not truly
known in the beginning; it is the science of logic in its whole compass which first
constitutes the completed knowledge of it with its developed content and first
truly grounds that knowledge. 157
The first quote may be a bit optimistic, since it speaks of returning to the starting point
and coming to see it as “the truth.” It seems just as likely that we might return to the
starting point and discover it to be largely false, though false in a sense that still allows us
to move forward towards the truth. In any case, both passages describe philosophy as a
process where we come to recognize the ground of what we initially took as ungrounded.
The recognition of this ground allows us to conceive the original beginning as determined
or mediated, and thus it allows us to properly conceive the ground for the first time.
6) Conclusion
The nature of genuine change and the structure of judgment present us with
closely related paradoxes. Both involve a moment of identity and a moment of
difference. The paradox arises from the necessity of grasping the unity of these two
moments. From the standpoint of the understanding or reflection, a standpoint that
construes reality in terms of either abstract identity or mere aggregation, the nature of
change and the structure of judgment appear contradictory. If we construe change as the
movement of “P-S1” to “P-S2,” then reflection must construe the relation between P and
S1 or S2 either in terms of (a) aggregation or (b) abstract identity. In other words, it must
156 Science of Logic, p.p. 70-1.
157 .Science of Logic, pp. 71-2.
146