THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Two will briefly consider Hegel solution to the problem. It will sketch Hegel’s account
of the object in terms of its teleological and self-constitutional activity.
2.1) The Nature of Genuine Change: One Example of a More Basic Problem
Hegel does not specifically discuss the nature of change in terms of the unity of
identity and difference. 105 Nonetheless, the nature of change presents a conceptual
challenge that clearly illustrates the problem of the unity of identity and difference. In
fact, the phenomenon of change provides one of the clearest examples of this problem.
Before considering the nature of change as an illustration of the unity of identity and
difference, it is worth noting that Bradley and Taylor both emphasize the problematic
nature of change, and that they both associate the problem of change with the problem of
the one and the many, which is itself a form of the problem of identity and difference. 106
For instance, Bradley says:
It [change] points back to the dilemma of the one and the many, the differences
and the identity, the adjectives and the thing [i.e. the relation of inherence
between properties and substance], the qualities and the relations. How anything
can possibly be anything else was a question which defied our efforts. Change is
little beyond an instance of this dilemma in principle. 107
105 The problem of change gets taken up in Post-Kantian German philosophy in terms of the
problem of the unity of apperception. In this context, the “I think” presents the unity or identity that
accompanies, or at least can accompany, all of my representations. As the representations constantly
change through time, they present the difference or manifold plurality. Thus the question of the unity of
identity and difference becomes the question about the unity (or essential relation) between the “I think”
and the manifold of representations that are thought. In the question about the unity of apperception, the
problem of change and the structure of judgment are related, since on Hegel’s view, the forms of judgment
simply present different ways by which the mind relates the plurality of the manifold to the unity of the “I
think.” For a further discussion of this problem, see Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter 5, where I discuss Hegel’s
views on apperception as they are presented in the Differenzschrift and Glauben und Wissen.
106 It should be noted that I worked out the details of my discussion of time before discovering
similar discussions in F.H. Bradley and A.E. Taylor. It should also be noted that John McTaggart, another
philosopher heavily influenced by Hegel, also presents similar discussions of time.
107 Appearance and Reality, p. 38.
104