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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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So the unifying function of consciousness doesn’t replace diversity with unity. Instead, it<br />

increases diversity and unity. To draw on terms from Chapter Two again, consciousness<br />

makes mental life truer. 193<br />

Our discussion of Quote 1 makes it clear that all mental phenomena – including<br />

sensations, intuitions, desires, needs, and instincts – already contain logical or conceptual<br />

structure. Stated differently, they already involve the structure and the activity of<br />

judgment. While Quote 1 makes it seem as though only mental phenomena possess<br />

conceptual structure, our careful examination of Quote 3 should make it clear that both<br />

natural and mental phenomena possess logical structure. It is the conscious articulation<br />

of conceptual structure, or at least the potential for conscious articulation of such<br />

structure, that distinguishes mind from nature.<br />

If the discussion of Quote 3 does not sufficiently establish the existence of<br />

conceptual structures in the natural world, Quote 2 makes the point abundantly clear. 194<br />

193 In the following passage, which will be discussed further in section 5.6, Hegel emphasizes the<br />

relationship between unifying conceptual activity and the presence of diversity to the mind. Hegel says:<br />

“This state of indifference is, to a certain extent, a relapse into a state of barbarism. The savage attends to<br />

practically nothing; he lets everything pass him by without fixing his attention on it. Only by training the<br />

mind does attention acquire strength and fulfill its function. The botanist, for example, observes<br />

incomparably more in a plant than one ignorant of botany does in the same thing” (Philosophy of Mind,<br />

448Z). In this passage, Hegel claims that an increase in the conceptual unity of experience is, at the same<br />

time, a development and an enrichment of the diversity of experience. Thus Hegel rejects the common<br />

Romantic opposition between the richness or diversity of immediate experience and the arid or empty<br />

abstractions of thought. In response to such views, Hegel argues again and again that thought needn’t be<br />

abstract. This Romantic dichotomy rests upon the mistaken notion that articulation or difference is<br />

immediately given to us, that the mind simply unifies what is given as an articulated plurality. Contrary to<br />

this, Hegel argues that prior to the basic conceptual activities involved in the act of attention, nothing is<br />

given to us. Such minimal experience approximates a blur. Hegel contrasts this relatively “immediate”<br />

experience of the world with the experience of the botanist. The conceptual activities of the botanist<br />

actually allow her to perceive more diversity or detail. Conceptual articulation produces greater unity and<br />

greater diversity, because it always consists in both articulation and unification. There can’t be unification<br />

without articulation. Nor can there be articulation without unification.<br />

194 Consider also the following passage from the Science of Logic. Speaking of “the Notion,” or<br />

conceptual structure, Hegel says: “the Notion is to be regarded not as the act of the self-conscious<br />

understanding, not as the subjective understanding, but as the Notion in its own absolute character which<br />

constitutes a stage of nature as well as of spirit. Life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature at which the<br />

199

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