THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Bradley refers to change as “an instance of this dilemma in principle.” The “dilemma”
here is the problem of the one and the many, or the problem of the relation between
identity and difference. Bradley argues that this same problem or dilemma can be found
in the structure of the object, in the relation between the unity of a thing and the plurality
of its properties. So Bradley holds (a) that change presents an example of a more general
problem, the problem of identity and difference, and (b) that the same conceptual
problem arises when we consider the structure of the thing.
Taylor makes similar points in the Elements of Metaphysics. He says:
Change, then, may be defined as succession within an identity, the identity being
as essential to the character of the process as the succession. In what way, then,
must we think of this identity or common nature which is present throughout the
whole succession of changes? It should be clear that this question – how that
which changes can be permanent? – is simply our old problem of quality and
substance, how the many states can belong to one thing. 108
Taylor argues that our conception of change must grasp the relationship between the
identity that persists through the change and the differences that constitute the
“succession.” Like Bradley, Taylor sees this problem as but one example of a much
more general problem, one that we also face when we attempt to conceive the structure of
the object as the relation between the unity of a substance and the plurality of its
properties. Both the nature of change and the structure of the object present the problem
of the unity of identity and difference.
108 Elements of Metaphysics, p. 161.
105