THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Hegel uses the categories “infinite” and “finite” to express a host of relations,
including the (a) the relation between ground and grounded, (b) the relation between
simplicity and plurality, and (c) the relationship between things traditionally construed as
transcendent (God, freedom, immortal soul) and things traditionally construed as
immanent (nature, body). On traditional conceptions of the “I” as a substance, the “I” is
the simple, transcendent, unity that grounds the immanent plurality of the self as
experienced. Hegel also associates the relation between the indeterminate and the
determinate with the relation between the infinite and the finite. The infinite is that
which is indeterminate – i.e. not determined – but rather determining. By contrast, the
finite is that which is determinate because it is determined.
If we abstract the identity of the “I” from its different representations, we
conceive the “I” as the simple, transcendent, non-determinate ground in sharp contrast to
the plurality of immanent, determinate, grounded representations. In terms that Hegel
uses to sum up all of these various categories, this conception of the “I” presents an
absolute distinction between the infinite and the finite. Hegel sees this conception of the
“I” as a result of reflection or the understanding, a mode of thought that abstracts, a mode
of thought that fails to grasp the dynamic nature of reality. Hegel argues that this mode
of thought, which posits a rigid distinction between identity and difference, the infinite
and the finite, the “I” and its representations, cannot explain the relation between these
divisions. Here Hegel repeats the criticism we have already seen in Jacobi. 258
258 Of course what has been said so far doesn’t present Hegel’s argument against a conception of
the “I” as a transcendent, simple substance. What I have said thus far simply states the result of that
argument – namely, that if we conceive the “I” as a simple, transcendent substance, we cannot explain the
relation between it, as simple and transcendent, and our experience, as manifold and immanent. Hegel’s
arguments for this point come primarily in his critique of the rationalist doctrine of substance.
Furthermore, even if we accept Hegel’s claim that we cannot conceive the relation between a simple
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