THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Within the context of an extended discussion of the relationship between the
understanding and the manifolds of space and time, this passage points out the centrality
of the terms “unity” and “plurality” for Jacobi’s reception and interpretation of Kantian
philosophy. This passage also anticipates Hegel’s philosophy, presenting a host of proto-
Hegelian expressions and insights.
This passage anticipates one of the central claims of Hegelian philosophy –
namely, the claim that if we begin with a conception of two things as fully separate or
distinct, we will be incapable of grasping their relation or unity. It also presents the
equally important Hegelian claim that in order to grasp the unity of two apparently
oppositional terms, we must grasp them “in one another,” and “at the same time.” Here
Jacobi uses the term “zugleich.” As we will see, Hegel uses this term again and again to
describe the way that reason or speculation grasp two oppositional moments, moments
such as identity and difference or synthesis and antithesis. 233 We should also note how
Jacobi links up a host of different issues in terms of the opposition between unity and
plurality. Specifically, he uses this opposition to express the relation between (a)
understanding and sensibility as well as (b) thought and being.
Bracketing questions about the plausibility of Jacobi’s criticism of Kant,
questions that lie outside the scope of the merely exegetical analysis presented in this
chapter, we can turn to another passage where Jacobi explains the ultimately mysterious
union of the one and the many in terms of the “individual.” He says:
233 This chapter presents many examples of Hegel’s use of the term “zugleich” to describe the
manner in which we must grasp apparently oppositional concepts. Another significant example can be
found in the Science of Logic, in the passage where Hegel describes the structure of the “I” as the structure
of the Notion. After describing the first two moments, which he expresses in terms of the opposition
between the indeterminate and the determinate, as well as that between the universal and the particular,
Hegel goes on to say: “neither the one nor the other can be truly comprehended unless the two indicated
moments are grasped at the same time [zugleich]” (p. 583).
229