THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

to the Science of Logic, Hegel explains the purpose of the Phenomenology in relation to
the Logic. He says:
In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have exhibited consciousness in its movement
onwards from the first immediate opposition of itself and the object to absolute
knowing. The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation of
consciousness to the object and has the Notion of science for its result. This
Notion…therefore needs no justification here because it has received it in that
work. 10
The Phenomenology considers “every form of the relation of consciousness to the
object,” beginning with the most immediate conception of this relation. 11 The book
moves dialectically, uncovering inherent contradictions in each form of the relation of
consciousness to the object until it reaches the standpoint of “absolute knowing” or the
“Notion of science.”
Hegel describes absolute knowing as “thought in so far as this is just as much the
object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought.” 12
He also argues that the Logic “presupposes [this] liberation from the opposition of
Ego is further said to be one that liberates the essential or true nature of the object: it may profoundly
change the manner in which things stand before us in sensation, intuition, or representation, but this change
of manner is no subjective distortion as maintained in the Critical Philosophy: it is a bringing out of what
the thing in itself truly is” (Encyclopedia Logic, ix). Though his account of Kant’s transcendental idealism
may be somewhat prejudicial, the basic distinction stands. Hegel’s philosophy presents what Kant would
describe as a kind of transcendental realism. Shortly after this passage, Findlay continues: “It is not
necessary for one to observe how much all these dicta hark back to Plato and Aristotle rather than to Kant
and Fichte” (Encyclopedia Logic, ix).
10 Science of Logic, p. 48.
11 Here we must distinguish between “consciousness,” as a section in the Phenomenology, and
consciousness considered as a general structure that, at least implicitly, characterizes each stage in the
progression of the Phenomenology. As I argue in Appendix to Chapter Four, all awareness involves at
least some minimal distinction between the subject and object. The sections that comprise the
“Consciousness” section of the Phenomenology also argue for this point. Thus, for instance, the beginnings
of the distinction between subject and object can already be seen in the dialectic of the here and the now.
Both terms always refer to (a) some objective point in space and time, and (b) the present position of the
subject. So the section on consciousness uncovers the basic subject-object structure of awareness,
experience, and cognition. This same basic structure, however, plays an important role in all of the various
kinds of awareness, experience, and cognition considered throughout the Phenomenology.
12 Science of Logic, p. 49.
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