THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

“Doctrine of the Notion” presents Hegel’s rejection of some traditional conceptions of
substance and his development of the notion. In his reflections on “The Notion in
General,” Hegel discusses the transition from the traditional conception of the substance
to his own doctrine of the notion. He says:
The relationship of substance considered simply and solely in its own intrinsic
nature leads on to its opposite, to the Notion. The exposition of substance
(contained in the last book) which leads on to the Notion is, therefore, the sole
and genuine refutation of Spinozism. It is the unveiling of substance, and this is
the genesis of the Notion, the chief moments of which have been brought together
above. The unity of substance is the relation of necessity; but this unity is only an
inner necessity; in positing itself through the moment of absolute negativity it
becomes a manifested or posited identity, and thereby the freedom which is the
identity of the Notion. 38
Hegel’s discussion in the “Doctrine of Essence,” the “last book” mentioned in the
passage above, presents an immanent critique of the doctrine of substance. The doctrine
of substance explains the “unity” of the genuine thing in terms of “necessity.” Thus
Hegel says the “unity of substance is the relation of necessity.” Hegel argues that
necessity cannot adequately explain or ground the unity of the genuine object. 39
dieser Terminus in seiner Grundbedeutung genommen wird. Es gibt also einen und nur einen Begriff, der
Gegenstand des kennzeicheneden Ausdruck ‘der Begriff’ ist” (Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie
Hegels, p. 129). Fulda doesn’t provide any justification for this claim, though there are two relatively
straightforward reasons one might make it. First, if one ascribes a kind of strong monism to Hegel, a
monism according to which there is only one genuine object, then it naturally follows that there is only one
notion. Second, one might argue that since Hegel uses the definite article when speaking of the notion, it
follows that he must be referring to one particular thing. The first reason for making the claim may be
correct, though obviously I disagree with it. If it is correct, however, its correctness can only be established
as the result of an overall interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. As such, it doesn’t serve as a prima facie
objection to my interpretation of the notion. If the second claim were convincing, it would present an
important objection to my interpretation. However, this claim misconstrues the meaning of the definite
article in this context. In the same way that Frege speaks of the “Der Gedanke,” without intending to imply
that there is only one thought, and in the same way that a nature documentary might speak of the eating
habits of “the artic fox,” without intending to imply that there is only one artic fox, so also Hegel speaks of
“the notion,” without intending to convey that there is only one notion. For a further defense of the claim
that there are multiple notions, see Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s Wahrheit aus dem Begriff (pp. 45-46).
38 Science of Logic, p. 581.
39 More accurately stated, Hegel argues that necessity cannot explain the relationship between the
unity and the plurality of the object. Leibniz and Spinoza conceive the relationship between the substance
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