THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

English language – that provide her experience with content. 203 Without any such
analytical skills, Hegel plausibly argues that her experience would be an undifferentiated
blur. She would be like the “savage” who attends to practically nothing, who therefore
experiences practically nothing. This example forcefully illustrates the role of cognitive
– particularly analytical – capacities in even our most basic levels of awareness.
5.7) Synthesis of the Three Descriptions
Hegel describes the act of attention as (1) an act that distinguishes the object from
the subject, while also relating them, as (2) an act that first articulates or constitutes the
structure of space and time for the mind, and as (3) an awareness of some object (in the
loosest sense) or feature of reality in distinction from other objects or features. 204
Ultimately, our ability to focus our attention on something consists in a complex series of
largely implicit and interrelated acts. These three different descriptions of attention
describe various sub-acts that constitute the unified act of attention. The term “sub-act”
expresses the sense in which these various acts are essentially interrelated and
interdependent.
We can present the relation between these three sub-acts in terms of a modified
transcendental argument, one that includes certain hermeneutic elements. The third
203 Language presents another apt example of Hegel’s point. When we listen to a completely
foreign language, we are not able to pick out distinct words. It even proves difficult to pick out distinct or
repeated sounds. As a result, the sounds flow by us without distinction, and if we do not carefully focus on
them, they simply slide into the background of our consciousness. Here the analytical ability to pick out
distinct sounds and words enriches – rather than impoverishes – our experience.
204 In what follows, I will use the term “thing” in the loosest possible sense. As such, the term
simply refers to anything – to any facet of reality – that can become the focal point of our attention. Here
we can contrast this general sense with the previously given definition of a genuine thing. The existence of
a genuine thing, as unified and distinct entity, does not depend upon the cognitive activity of the mind. In
other words, the principle of individuation and unity that constitute the thing do not derive from our mental
activities. Taken in the loosest sense possible, as it is here, the term “thing” refers to anything that can be
considered by us as one or distinct.
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