THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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follows that a general statement of the universal, considered in abstraction from the particular, must always be revised in light of the different particulars that instantiate it. With regards to the telos of an object, there are thus at least two kinds of questions we can ask. First, we can ask about the degree to which a particular object instantiates the telos that determines its kind. Second, we can ask about the degree to which the telos that determines its kind instantiates the more general telos of all objects. The first question considers the degree of truth of the object within its kind, while the second question considers the degree of truth that the kind itself possesses. Even if an individual fully instantiates the telos of its particular kind, there is always some sense in which it fails to achieve its more general telos. In other words, there is always a gap between the telos of a thing qua particular kind of thing – as a fungus, an oak tree, a snail, a chimpanzee, or a state – and the telos of the thing qua thing – i.e. as the striving of the thing to integrate the greatest degree of complexity in the most developed form of unity. 94 This gap manifests itself in different ways in different kinds of things. When we consider the telos of a particular kind of thing, that telos will always suggest but fail to instantiate some more developed form of unity. Alternatively, it will suggest the manner for incorporating a greater degree of diversity, but it will fail to do so. Thus each particular kind of telos presents a specific kind of failure, a failure that already suggests 94 Hegel makes this point in the following passage. He says: “God alone is the thorough harmony of notion and reality. All finite things involve an untruth: they have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet the requirement of the notion. For this reason they must perish, and then the incompatibility between their notion and their existence becomes manifest” (Encyclopedia Logic, paragraph 24Z). Death consists in the triumph of diversity over unity. It consists either in the imposition of the external environment on the organized unity of the thing, or else in the loss of control by the unity over the diversity integrated within it. Among other things, death points to the “untruth” of objects like plants, animals, and states when considered in relation to the scale of truth. God represents the pinnacle of this scale, and only he is immortal. However, here we should remember that the term “God” simply designates the process of history, the collective process by which human work or social activity transforms the natural world through a continuous and unending process. 83
the solution. The next highest kind of thing overcomes this failure. It provides a solution for the “problem” posed by the kind of object that falls beneath it on the scale of truth. The resolution of the inherent problem in the structure of each kind of thing provides the motion of the dialectic. It also explains the third claim expressed by Hegel’s peculiar phrase that “X is the truth of Y.” According to this claim, X is the truth of Y because objects of kind X resolve or overcome the particular kind of failure inherent in the objects of kind Y. 2.5) The Completion of Truth in the Unity of Identity and Difference Hegel proclaims that, “truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference.” Thus far we have examined the meaning of the claim “truth is complete.” We have seen (1) that Hegel ascribes truth to objects; (2) that he uses the terms “true,” “good,” and “free” more or less interchangeably; (3) that truth, goodness, and freedom consist in the correspondence between the concrete object and the inherent norm or telos that determines the kind of the object; (4) that objects of a particular kind can be ranked in terms of their degree of truth, depending on how fully they instantiate their telos; (5) that objects of different kinds can be ranked in terms of their degree of truth, depending on how fully their kinds instantiate the more general telos that determines all things qua things; and that (6) the different degrees of truth ascribed to different kinds of objects allows us to place all of these objects on one scale of truth, the highest point of which consists in an object that unites the greatest degree of diversity (all things and all other kinds) into the highest form of unity. The highest object in scale is the collective transformation of the world that constitutes human history. 84
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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENC
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Michael Eugene Morris in terms of c
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks………
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7) Essay on Natural Right: The Unit
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interpret these issues as an expres
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even “naively metaphysical.” 4
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immanent metaphysics. Insofar as He
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consciousness.” 13 Thus the Scien
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all genuine objects consist in some
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This section does not explain the m
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transitions from abstract right to
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The second moment of the will is th
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self as “pure infinity,” thus d
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will and the third part of the book
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3.2) The Notion: Substance as Subje
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is movement towards a “purpose.
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Therefore he argues we must replace
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judgment of the plant. The illustra
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the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes t
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Page 45 and 46: 3.5) The “I” as Instantiation o
Page 47 and 48: of the self are genuine moments rat
Page 49 and 50: moments of the will. With regard to
Page 51 and 52: Before examining these issues, we s
Page 53 and 54: the third moment of the will, the m
Page 55 and 56: 1.1) Preliminary Remarks CHAPTER TW
Page 57 and 58: certain traditional conceptions of
Page 59 and 60: conception that considers a thing a
Page 61 and 62: thing is “nothing.” Thus Bradle
Page 63 and 64: crucial ways. 71 Moreover, we are n
Page 65 and 66: From this brief survey, the followi
Page 67 and 68: If we can think of the thing’s qu
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Page 71 and 72: different ways as his philosophy pr
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Page 77 and 78: Hegel believes that truth and falsi
Page 79 and 80: Hegel even insists that physical an
Page 81 and 82: 2.4) The Degrees of Truth Ascribed
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Page 89: higher kinds. The most general univ
Page 93 and 94: In the most general and abstract te
Page 95 and 96: The unity of identity and differenc
Page 97 and 98: of identity and difference, reason
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Page 103 and 104: Third, we have the moment that unit
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Page 107 and 108: CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF GENUINE
Page 109 and 110: Our discussion of these phenomena s
Page 111 and 112: Two will briefly consider Hegel sol
Page 113 and 114: 2.2) Difference, Identity, and Unit
Page 115 and 116: The second and third moments distin
Page 117 and 118: The moments of identity and differe
Page 119 and 120: The structure of judgment presents
Page 121 and 122: is red.” In this judgment, the su
Page 123 and 124: “identity” and “connection.
Page 125 and 126: interpretation assumes that “is
Page 127 and 128: judgments present the most develope
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Page 131 and 132: speculation grasps the unity that u
Page 133 and 134: that is also a connecting. Thus jud
Page 135 and 136: Judgment obviously involves two men
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Page 139 and 140: 5.4) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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we must carefully distinguish betwe
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all into the abyss of vacuity witho
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divides and articulates that which,
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5.5) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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as (b) a process that starts with u
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The essential requirement for the s
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Through this progress [which is als
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inhere in this substance. Thus we c
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conversely, the understanding const
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1) Introduction CHAPTER FOUR THE NA
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consider judgment as a series of ac
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Each judgment contains two obvious
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then there would be no basis for di
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In order to grasp the structure of
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In order to grasp the structure of
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corresponds to the way the object i
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contradicts it, this is to be recog
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make between different features of
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Here Hegel considers a conception o
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determining the exact nature of the
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moment of analysis. Moreover, we sa
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conception of the substance as subj
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says: “Only this self-restoring s
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elation to the unity that constitut
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instantiate their telos fully. Or,
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inextricably entwined with its othe
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epresentation to all objects. Moreo
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telos, and the telos can only be co
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experience in which certain things
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In this passage, Hegel speaks of th
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make it “an independent object”
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prior to our cognitive awareness of
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inarticulate norms or categories. A
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In Quote 2 Hegel argues from the ex
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unity to be analyzed, not as a plur
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In Hegel’s description of the act
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to the world. This means that the m
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Ultimately, the misleading nature o
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English language - that provide her
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of experience. These are changes in
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5.8) No Discrete Plurality Given Pr
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1) Introduction CHAPTER FIVE THE UN
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identity and difference. In other w
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“plurality,” clearly demonstrat
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In the Darstellung meines Systems d
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difference must also be accepted.
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Schelling construes difference as m
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3) Jacobi: The Mysterious Unity of
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Only a determinate can determine an
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original unity (Urgemeinschaft) is
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object. In contrast to Jacobi, howe
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particular. I argued that the struc
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In the Systemfragment Hegel also de
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plurality as the problem of graspin
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present various ways of unifying th
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There is a second, more important r
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The following passages summarizes m
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apparently contradictory moments in
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apperception, actually provides the
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As he also states elsewhere in his
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view, Kant fails to recognize the f
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Here we see the basic structure of
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see further a connection between th
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issues and the views of his two pre
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difference illuminate, explain, and
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chapters could enrich and further s
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illustrates the alternative concept
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Philosophy of Right. Here we can im
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In an article entitled, “The basi
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the fundamental rights and interest
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ealize the kind of self-determinati
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The hermeneutic process illustrates
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necessary condition for the possibi
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So each stage of the dialectic incl
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In the following passage, Hegel cha
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“Sittlichkeit” presents the uni
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Hegel’s discussion of civil socie
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The standpoint of civil society see
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Civil society also rests upon the d
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can be defined in terms of some bio
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different from others. The desire t
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civil society. 330 The final senten
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point even more forcefully in his d
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Hegel’s view, the contradictions
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which the individual participates,
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argument, and on the basis of this
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HEGEL'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY Werke. F
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Fulda, Hans Friedrich. (1978) “He
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Neuhouser, Frederick. (2000) Founda
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