THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

subject consider the self or will in terms of its determinate content. The first moment of
the will involves the “dissipation of every restriction and content,” while the second
moment consists in the “positing of a determinacy as a content and object.” The same
contrast can be found in the distinction between the personhood and moral subjectivity.
Considered as person, the self is “contentless.” It is a “completely abstract ego in which
every restriction and value is negated and without validity.” Considered as subject, the
self determines itself through the “content which it gives itself.”
Thus far I have been arguing that the three moments of the will correspond to the
three parts of the Philosophy of Right. The relationship between the first two moments of
the will and the first two parts of the book should be clear. Hegel characterizes the first
two moments of the will in terms of the opposition between the universal and the
particular, the opposition between the infinite and the finite, and the opposition between
the indeterminate and the determinate. He then describes the third moment of the will as
the unity of these various oppositional terms. Hegel uses the same oppositional terms to
characterize the first two parts of the Philosophy of Right. The first part of the book
conceives the self in terms of personhood, a conception of the self that emphasizes
universality, infinitude, and indeterminacy. The second part of the book conceives the
self as subject. It characterizes the self in terms of finitude, particularity, and
determinacy.
The third part of the book – the part on ethical life – develops the third moment of
the will. In the same way that the third moment of the will unites the first two moments,
so also the third part of the book unites the crucial insights contained in the first two
parts. At this point in our investigation, the relationship between the third moment of the
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