THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

other. He considers the self as an empirically given collection of aims and desires, as a
“totality of wants” that stem from “caprice and physical necessity.” The standpoint of
civil society contrasts the empirically given desires and needs of the individual with the
social interactions that serve as the “means” for the fulfillment of these desires and needs.
Hegel refers to these social interactions, considered in their totality, as the “form of
universality.”
In accordance with his general account of the dialectic, Hegel sets out the
standpoint of civil society in terms of the rigid or complete distinction between (1) the
needs and desires of the individual as a private person, and (2) and the totality of social
interactions that serve as a means for fulfilling these desires and needs. The standpoint of
civil society explains the relationship between these distinct categories in terms of the
relationship between means and ends. In other words, it assumes that social interactions
serve merely as means for satisfying the needs and desires of the individual. In civil
society, the individual “finds satisfaction by means of the others.” Or, as Hegel states
elsewhere:
Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are private persons whose
end is their own interest. This end is mediated through the universal which thus
appears as a means to its realization [emphasis added]. 320
In this context, the term “universal” designates the institutions, practices, and contractual
relations that unite individuals in society. Civil society conceives these unifying bonds
and relationships exclusively as means intended to fulfill the needs and desires of
“private persons.” 321
320 Philosophy of Right, paragraph 187.
321 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls discusses “private society,” a conception of the social realm that
he explicitly compares with Hegel’s conception of civil society. Speaking of “private society,” Rawls says:
287