THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

contradicts it, this is to be recognized as a reflection of mine. Now, there also
occurs in the perception various properties which seem to be properties of the
Thing; but the Thing is a One, and we are conscious that this diversity by which it
would cease to be a One falls in us. So in point of fact, the Thing is white only to
our eyes, also tart to our tongue, also cubical to our touch, and so on. We get the
entire diversity of these aspects, not from the thing, but from ourselves; and they
fall asunder in this way for us, because the eye is quite distinct from the tongue,
and so on. We are thus the universal medium in which such moments are kept
apart and exist each on its own. Through the fact, then, that we regard the
characteristics of being a universal medium as our reflection, we preserve the selfidentity
and truth of the Thing, its being One. 169
Hegel begins by saying, “I become aware of the thing as a One.” It would be more
accurate to say that I begin by assuming that the thing is a one. This is an assumption
that I make, one that appears to contradict my immediate perceptual awareness of the
thing as a plurality. In terms of the example that Hegel provides, we experience or
perceive the sugar as “white,” “tart,” “cubical,” etc. Since we assume that the object is
one, or “a one,” as Hegel puts it, we must conclude that this plurality derives from our
manner of perceiving it. On this view, judgment or cognition restores the unity that the
object has lost through the process of perception. Judgment combines the plurality of
perception in an attempt to restore the unity of the object.
Of course, as we have already said, this conception of the object contradicts our
original assumption that the moments of the judgment reflect or capture the moments of
the object. Here we can begin to see the justification for this assumption. If, as we have
assumed here, only the unity of the judgment captures the true nature of the object, then
we only cognize the object when we have left the plurality of perception behind.
However, as we have seen in the last chapter, pure unity devoid of all difference is the
same as nothing. Unity devoid of all difference is, as Hegel puts it, the night in which all
169 Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 72. As we saw in Section 1.2 of Chapter Two, the issues presented
in this passage play a crucial role in Bradley’s philosophy. See also Appearance and Reality, p. 16, and
Essay IV in Volume Two The Principles of Logic.
166