THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

in other works, such as the Phenomenology of Spirit. Therefore, such philosophers might
argue, we should not be too hasty to apply these very general remarks about the dialectic
to specific passages in the Philosophy of Right. 312
In response to this objection, this section considers a specific example of the
dialectic in the Philosophy of Right – namely, the transition from “Morality” to
“Sittlichkeit.” In accordance with the general remarks made in the previous section, we
will see (1) that the section on morality develops a fundamental distinction between
rigidly oppositional categories; (2) that these oppositional categories lead to
contradictions; (3) that “Sittlichkeit” provides the more basic unity that grounds the
oppositional categories of “Morality,” and (4) that the categories presented in Hegel’s
discussion of morality must be reinterpreted from the standpoint of this more basic unity.
The section on morality construes the individual as a subject. It develops various
conceptions of subjectivity, conceptions that presuppose a rigid or complete distinction
between subjectivity and objectivity. Among other things, it assumes we can characterize
subjective intentions without reference to the objective features of the intended action. It
determines the identity and moral culpability of the agent in relation to her subjective
intentions, thereby protecting her from unintended consequences and the contingencies of
the objective or external world.
312 In paragraph 31 of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explicitly claims that the Philosophy of Right
employs the dialectical method developed in Science of Logic and the first volume Encyclopedia. He says:
“The method whereby, in philosophic science, the concept develops itself out of itself is expounded in logic
and is here likewise presupposed.” Of course Hegel’s characterization of his mode of proceeding might be
wrong, and his claim here might simply express his wishful thinking about the unity of his method and the
unity of his system. Nonetheless, this passage presents at least prima facie support for the view that the
Philosophy of Right follows the specific form of the dialectical method discussed in the previous section.
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