THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

determining the exact nature of the two senses of the object, we are ultimately trying to
grasp the unity of the object as one and the object as many. We want, in other words, to
grasp the unity of unity and plurality, or the unity of identity and difference. Rather than
explain the unity of the object as one and the object as many, however, the approach
considered in Section 3.1 merely divides the object further, thus creating more entities
and further problems. It creates further division, rather than providing a basis for unity.
The approach considered in Section 3.1 introduces a new entity – namely, the object that
is conceived in different ways. This entity is distinct from the first two moments already
considered, from the two ways that the object itself may be conceived. Thus instead of
having two elements that need to be united – the object as one and the object as many, we
now have three elements that must be united – the object conceived as one, the object
conceived as many, and the object in itself. We set out to explain the relationship
between unity and plurality. Instead of explaining the relationship, however, we set up a
third entity between them. Thus instead of having one mysterious relationship to explain,
we now have two. We must now explain (a) the relationship between the thing conceived
as many and the thing, and (b) the relationship between the thing conceived as one and
the thing.
This failed approach presents the modus operandi of the understanding, a mode of
thought that (1) treats facets or moments of a thing as distinct entities, and that (2)
construes the world in static rather than dynamic terms. As we shall in Section 4, Hegel
argues that we can only conceive the relation between the unity and the plurality of the
thing if we take self-determined activity as the basic category that constitutes the thing,
and if we construe both the sense in which the object is one and the sense in which the
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