THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

asic outline of the solution to this challenge, though some of the details remain vague.
For the moment, it is simply important to note that the problem of the unity of identity
and difference requires us to conceive thought as a teleological process that begins with
an enfolded unity, that develops the parts out of this unity, and that finally synthesizes the
parts into an articulated unity. As I suggested in the Conclusion to Chapter Three, this
developmental process provides the basic outline for Hegel’s solution to the problem of
identity and difference as it occurs throughout his philosophy. In other words, Hegel
ultimately explains the structure of all objects in terms of a similar teleological and
developmental process.
This chapter continues the discussion begun in Chapter Three. In this chapter we
will consider judgment in relation to the structure of the object. Specifically, we will
consider judgment as a series of mental activities directed or animated by the intention to
grasp the structures of genuine objects. Here, as throughout this dissertation, I use the
term “genuine object” to designate an object that exists independently from the way that
we conceive it. A genuine object doesn’t simply exist because we – or any other mind
external to the object – happen to carve up or synthesize the world in some particular
way. In other words, it doesn’t derive its existence from our principles of individuation.
Ultimately, Hegel argues that a genuine object differentiates itself from the rest of the
world. For the moment, however, we will state this point in purely negative terms, and
simply claim that the principle that individuates a genuine object does not depend upon
mental activity outside the object.
In Sections 5.3 through 5.5 of the previous chapter, we considered judgment as a
series of activities that analyze and synthesize the world. In this chapter, we will
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