capitalism

524 Voluntarism
Further Readings
Aldridge, A. Owen. Voltaire and the Century of Light. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1975.
Durant, Will, and Ariel Durant. The Age of Voltaire: A History of
Civilization in Western Europe from 1715 to 1756. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1965.
Gay, Peter. Voltaire’s Politics: The Poet as Realist. 2nd ed. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988.
Knapp, Bettina Liebowitz. Voltaire Revisited. New York: Twayne,
2000.
VOLUNTARISM
Voluntarism—sometimes called philanthropy or charity—
is the donation of money, goods, and time either to those in
need or an otherwise worthy cause.
A question that confronts every society and every political
philosophy concerns our obligations to the poor and
unfortunate and how we are to extend them help. Probably
the most common answer involves an appeal to government
to supply them welfare benefits and other entitlements
financed through taxation. But free-market advocates maintain
that coercing people to assist others is wrong, both
pragmatically and in that it violates others’ rights. Instead,
they appeal to private organizations to provide the necessities
for those in need.
Pragmatically, free-market advocates argue that a taxed
and regulated society is less prosperous with less upward
mobility and thereby experiences poverty; the redistribution
of wealth can be a strong disincentive for people to
earn and so increases the number of people who need help.
Moreover, people who are taxed to underwrite the costs of
welfare are less likely to give voluntarily. The rise of the
welfare state is commonly viewed as the turning point at
which the large-scale philanthropy that marked 19thcentury
society disappeared. If government services were
removed, free-market advocates maintain that people
would be far more likely to voluntarily contribute to charity
and other community causes and in larger amounts. As
evidence, they point to the wide variety of private organizations
that currently exist even in competition with free—
that is, government—assistance.
Those who defend the free market further maintain that,
regardless of whether government best provides for the
poor, coercing such assistance violates individual rights.
As Robert Nozick phrased it, no one has “an enforceable
right”—that is, a legal claim—to assistance from another.
Even a drowning man should not be able to legally compel
aid from people on the shore. Rendering assistance may be
a moral duty, but this notion should not be taken as equivalent
to a legal duty. In many instances, acting within your
rights may be immoral. For example, lying to a friend does
not violate rights, but by most standards is immoral.
Equally, indifference to human suffering does not violate
rights, but may be immoral. Concluding that an action is
moral or immoral does not automatically translate into a call
for the state to either require or punish that action. Indeed,
to demand that all moral duties become legal obligations
would so constrict our lives as to deprive us of all freedom.
Thus, although free-market advocates agree that caring
for the needy is both proper and necessary, they hold on
pragmatic, ethical, and rights-based grounds that these
decisions are ultimately private and must rest with each
individual and his or her conscience.
See also Coercion; Taxation; Welfare State
Further Readings
WME
Machan, Tibor. “Does Libertarianism Imply the Welfare State?” Res
Publica 3 no. 2 (1997): 131–148.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic
Books, 1974.
Rand, Ayn. “Government Financing in a Free Society.” The Virtue of
Selfishness. New York: Signet Books, 1964.
VOLUNTARY CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT
Most people believe that a market economy requires that
governments enforce private contracts. Although some
people may recognize that simple face-to-face trades are
possible without external enforcement, most people argue
that government enforcement is necessary when contracts
are complicated, include commitments over time, or
involve large groups. In many real-world situations, however,
enforcement of contracts by public courts is too
costly—government courts are not perfect, after all—or
impossible, inasmuch as government courts often lack
jurisdiction across political boundaries or the desire to
enforce contracts in sectors not sanctioned by law. The private
sector, in contrast, has found numerous ways to promote
contractual performance even when government
enforcement is absent. From the discipline of continuous
dealings in small groups, to reputation mechanisms or more
formal private tribunals for large groups, numerous devices
have emerged that have made possible contractual performance
independent of government. Recognizing that
private parties can overcome the potential problem of contractual
performance brings into question whether government
enforcement of contracts is necessary. This topic is of
growing interest to libertarians.