capitalism

34 Bioethics
perspective of ethical theory. At the end of the 19th century,
Herbert Spencer, in his book, The Principles of Ethics, tried
to provide a scientific foundation for a libertarian ethics.
However, since then, there has been no such comprehensive
effort. Both Murray Rothbard in The Ethics of Liberty and
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. in The Foundations of Bioethics
provide fundamental theories of justice, not comprehensive
theories of ethics. Others, such as Tibor Machan in
Generosity and Ayn Rand in The Virtue of Selfishness, focus
on analyzing a particular moral principle and do not provide
a theoretical foundation for an entire libertarian theory of
personal morality, although Rand clearly thinks she does.
What, then, would the theoretical foundations of a libertarian
personal morality look like? First, like libertarian
theories of justice, liberty would have to occupy a place of
paramount importance. Several well-known ethical theorists,
albeit not libertarians, make liberty central to their
theories of personal morality. Aristotle, John Stuart Mill,
and Immanuel Kant are among the most famous moral
philosophers to stress that, without freedom, including the
freedom to make mistakes, there can be no true moral conduct.
Without choice, there is no morally blameworthy or
praiseworthy actions, no good or bad conduct, no good or
bad people. There is only more or less determined action,
with little room for the intentional internalization of a moral
code or personal moral growth. In addition, each of these
great philosophers also stipulated what they believed that
personal code should be.
Aristotle put forward a theory known as “virtue ethics.”
In the Nicomachean Ethics, written as a practical guide for
his son, Aristotle stressed both that human beings naturally
strove to better themselves and that virtue was the path to
moral goodness. Aristotle argued that the good person is
one who intentionally chooses to make practical wisdom
and virtue habitual. The virtues at issue were temperance,
courage, pride, truthfulness, fairness, and friendliness,
among others.
John Stuart Mill, the most famous proponent of utilitarian
ethics, argued that actions should be judged as right or
wrong based on how well they contributed to the aggregate
good of society, usually expressed in terms of the maximization
of happiness. As he contended in On Liberty: “I
regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions;
but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the
permanent interest of man as a progressive being. . . .”
Immanuel Kant is known as the father of rationally
based deontological theories of ethics. Most deontological
or duty-based systems of ethics are theological, but Kant’s
Enlightenment version claims its foundation in reason.
Kant held that ethics provided the laws of freedom, the way
physics provided the laws of nature. “Nothing in the
world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly
be conceived which could be called ‘good’ without
qualification except a good will.”
Kant proffered a rule, a categorical imperative, in which
he argued that appeals should be made to common human
reason: “Can I will that my maxim becomes a universal
law?” This one simple sentence is the rational foundation of
all moral conduct, Kant argued. Morally correct actions are
conduct that one would find reasonable for everyone. The
nonaggression axiom, embraced by libertarians, fits Kant’s
categorical imperative perfectly. It is logical not to aggress
against others because, were everyone to do so, there would
be chaos. With the help of Kant’s categorical imperative
and its corollary maxim of “respect for persons” as a precondition
of liberty, an individual is set to cultivate a good
will and become a better person. Although controversial,
this assertion is all but self-evident given the history and
theoretical foundations of libertarianism.
Many argue that there is something fundamentally
unlibertarian about the concept of the aggregate good,
which is inherent in all utilitarian theories, from the utilitarian
theory of Mill to the social contract theories of
Rousseau and Rawls. Individual freedom is not something
that should be tolerated (or extolled) because of its utility,
nor is it something to be traded for a promise that basic
material needs will be met. Liberty is important in and of
itself, not simply as a means to an end. For many libertarians,
individual freedom is of such paramount importance
that, even if it could be proven that liberty did not further
the general interests of society, they would not be willing
to give it up.
One way out of this utilitarian dilemma is to root the
primacy of liberty in an Aristotelian ethics or a Lockean
notion of natural rights. Aristotelian ethics has rightfully
been criticized as subjective and culture-bound and can
really only be redeemed by grounding it further in either
natural law or reason.
Under natural rights theories, freedom is either a Godgiven
right or an inherent aspect of human nature. The
problem with this type of theory is that some libertarians do
not believe in God or God-given rights, and others have
misgivings about the scope of natural rights. Who is to say
what qualifies as a natural right and on what grounds?
Perhaps the answer lies in what is reasonable. If that is the
case, then we need not rely on natural rights at all—and can
simply make reason the foundation of liberty. We are thus
brought back to the Enlightenment notion that reason can
lead to right action in the same way that it can lead to a just
system of government.
One theory that grounds liberty in reason was put forth
by Kant in his book, Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals. Libertarians who embrace this approach argue that
rational beings do not want others interfering in their decision
making, either public or private, economic or moral. In
short, respect for others necessitates the primacy of liberty.
Once it is clear that liberty is a necessary precondition of
any libertarian theory of ethics and that reason is the only