The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 84 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
to exfiltrate and move to the designated assembly area at Lewano
Kandow. As they straggled in, they found that the assault and containment
teams along with supply and evacuation personnel were
already waiting there. Major Sher Aqa discovered that all the groups,
except his support group, had withdrawn when the enemy tank column
arrived. All Mujahideen reached Lewano Kandow by 0200.
Mujahideen casualties were six wounded—one from the supporting
team who died on the way back, two from the assault team and three
from the containment team. It was not safe for the Mujahideen to
move further, since daybreak would be in two hours and the Mujaideen
would once again have to bypass the Soviet force at Grazak. The raid
on Pul-e Charkhi would clearly have alerted the Soviets to the presence
of a Mujahideen force in their area.
Two groups, Haji Hussein Jan's detachment and Sayed Hasan
Khan's party, decided to stay during the day in the Lewano Kandow
mountain since they could not reach their bases during the remaining
hours of the night. Major Sher Aqa's group, along with the
wounded, moved forward to Mulla Omar. This was only possible
since Hasan Khan Karokhel had sent trucks to Lewano Kandow to
carry the wounded and other Mujahideen to safety before daybreak.
The trucks, posing as militia patrols trying to hunt down the raiding
force, took these Mujahideen to Mulla Omar where they were
taken care of and medical personnel were summoned from Kabul
who tended to the wounded. The next night, the Mujahideen groups
returned to their bases and sent the body of the one dead warrior to
his family for burial.
COMMENTARY: The assistance extended by the Karokhel militia contributed
markedly to the Mujahideen success. Such assistance was
essential for actions conducted around a strongly defended city like
Kabul. From 1980 to 1984, the militia helped many Mujahideen infiltrate
into Kabul before defecting en masse to the resistance. Their
assistance was particularly important in suporting the withdrawal of
Mujahideen strike groups at the end of an action. Such inside help
made it possible for a force of more than 100 to launch a raid right in
the heart of the enemy stronghold. Ideally, a much smaller group, like
a 15-man team, would have been more appropriate to the task. But the
Mujahideen preferred to move in large groups. Large groups could
carry heavy loads, provide needed labor in the field and carry and
escort the wounded and dead. Many Mujahideen felt more comfortable
having their relatives or close friends with them.