The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 72 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
were forced to withdraw. We withdrew to our base in Ghorband by
the same route we came. We had no casualties.
COIVIMENIARY: The Soviets employed millions of mines in Afghanistan
for installation security, LOC security and area denial. Mine clearing
was a major problem for any Mujahideen attack on a prepared site and
often prevented Mujahideen success. The Mujahideen needed rugged,
light-weight mine detection and clearing gear which would allow them
to clear mines quickly under fire. Often the Mujahideen had to resort
to heaving large rocks to create a path through a minefield.
Attacking parked vehicles is certainly easier than attacking vehicles
which are crewed and moving. Apparently the Soviets had not
bothered to create a sandbag wall around their tanks, although an
RPG can penetrate the turret armor of older tanks.
The Mujahideen chose a target flanked by two other outposts that
could bring fire onto their attacking flanks. The flank security elements
were close-in elements that merely guarded the flanks and did
nothing to pin the outposts in position. The bridge outpost should have
been an easier target with a better chance of success. This attack also
could have employed a larger force in two phases. The first phase
would be an attack to the flanks to neutralize the flanking fire. The
second phase would then be an attack on the Totumdara post. Such an
attack would require better coordination and discipline than demonstrated.