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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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CHAPTER 15<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

"As a nation, we believed that history repeats itself. What<br />

happened in <strong>the</strong> 19th Century to <strong>the</strong> invading British would also be<br />

<strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soviet invaders. Philosophically, <strong>the</strong> Soviets believed<br />

that history is unidirectional, progressive and does not repeat itself.<br />

History did repeat itself and we did prevail."<br />

General Abdul Rahim Wardak<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> understood that guerrilla war is a contest <strong>of</strong><br />

endurance and national will. Battlefield victory is almost irrelevant,<br />

provided that <strong>the</strong> guerrilla survives to fight <strong>the</strong> next <strong>of</strong> a thousand<br />

battles before passing.<strong>the</strong> torch to his children. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> did<br />

not necessarily expect to win this war but fought because it was <strong>the</strong><br />

right thing to do—it was a religious and national obligation. <strong>The</strong>y<br />

accepted an asymmetry <strong>of</strong> casualties which eventually, but unexpectedly,<br />

led to <strong>the</strong> Soviet withdrawal.<br />

In many respects, <strong>the</strong> tactics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839<br />

1842, 1878-1880, 1919) still applied. Technology has added range<br />

and accuracy, but <strong>the</strong> terrain still dictates tactics and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

were quite comfortable applying <strong>the</strong>ir time-honored tactics against a<br />

modern foe. Much more innovation was required from <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

forces. Two modern systems, <strong>the</strong> helicopter and <strong>the</strong> antipersonnel<br />

mine, created severe tactical problems which were outside <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> historical experience. Tactical innovation occurs only<br />

where tactical innovation is required and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> eventually<br />

found ways to work around <strong>the</strong> problem technology. Where innovation<br />

was not required, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> stayed with <strong>the</strong> tried and true.<br />

Thus <strong>the</strong> basic <strong>Mujahideen</strong> ambush and pursuit were little changed<br />

from last century whereas <strong>the</strong>ir actions against an air assault or a<br />

fortified security post were quickly developed out <strong>of</strong> necessity.

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