The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 194 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
on unabated until my Mujahideen gunners set part of the base on fire
with some direct hits. This was the turning point in the battle. As
panic spread throughout the defenders, I led a 60-man assault group
through a ravine to the west of the base. We got on the highway
and attacked east. I instructed my men to stay on the pavement.
Two of my Mujahideen who strayed had their legs blown off by
mines. We moved quickly to the base entrance. The defenders had
little time to mount an organized defense, particularly since some of
the defenders had fled from their positions in panic and were rushing
to the river to escape the fire. We met little resistance in storming
the base. We captured scores of defenders including the base
commander, Rahmatullah Spelanay. We destroyed the tanks and
APCs and whatever else could not be moved. We continued the
attack to the east to help Task Force Hurricane which was locked in
battle with the defenders of the Khairokhel Post. As we Mujahideen
advanced from two directions, most of the Khairokhel defenders
fled toward the river. We captured the rest. The actions for the rest
of the day unfolded as detailed in the preceding vignette.
COMMENTARY: One estimate claims that the Soviets left over 13
million landmines behind in Afghanistan. The Soviets and DRA
surrounded their outposts and bases with minefields. A major
Mujahideen problem in capturing a position was getting through the
minefield. Mujahideen minefield clearing methods included:
• probing the ground cautiously in a slow advance;
• driving a flock of sheep through the minefield;
• heaving boulders ahead of an advance to provide stepping
stones for the advance;
• firing recoiless rifles into the minefield and creating a path via
the recoiless rifle craters;
• limited use of some mineclearing systems provided by western
and Arab backers.