The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 11, Vignette 13 Page 333
outpost were fast asleep and were caught by surprise. The enemy was
killing them when some of them woke up and a shoot-out ensued. The
Mujahideen at "Fatha" died to the last man.
The noise from the gunfire alerted the rest of my Mujahideen. The
second enemy column had not yet reached the crest of Spina Tsoka
mountain. My Mujahideen occupied fighting positions and met the
approaching enemy with heavy fire. A fierce battle continued throughout
the night. The enemy column was deep in our positions, but we
had cut off his withdrawal routes. We expected to bloody the enemy as
he fought to reopen his withdrawal routes. Instead, the enemy column
continued over the mountain path all the way to Pashad, some 20 kilometers
southwest of Sarkani. We did not expect the enemy to withdraw
in that direction.
Meanwhile, my Mujahideen directed heavy fire on the enemy at the
"Fatha" base and it began a fighting retreat back to Sarkani. By dawn,
the enemy had withdrawn from the Krer base and taken his dead and
wounded with him. Mujahideen losses included 18 killed and 20
wounded (again about 25% casualties).
COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA commander did a good job on analyzing
the pattern set by his forces in the area. Using this stereotype, the
DRA commander caught the Mujahideen commander by surprise, even
though he had been warned. The Soviet/DRA commander knew that
the Mujahideen considered the Soviets and DRA reluctant to move and
fight at night and reliant on readily identifiable terrain for night movement.
Therefore, he advanced stealthily at night over unexpected
approaches. This gave him tactical surprise and allowed him to wipe
out a critical Mujahideen outpost virtually without resistance.
However, his apparent lack of coordination between the two columns
disclosed his attack prematurely and denied victory the second
column. Had both columns been in position and launched their attacks
simultaneously, they might have achieved better results.
The Mujahideen were asleep despite sufficient warnings because
they reacted to a stereotype and pattern. Mujahideen actions, once
alerted, were commendable, particularly in cutting off the obvious
Soviet/DRA route of withdrawal. Whether the Soviet/DRA commander's
original plan included withdrawal over the Pashad mountain
route or whether it was a decision that he made on the spot, it clearly
saved the force from some heavy casualties. Had the Mujahideen also
blocked the Pashad route, the Soviet/DRA force might have been in
very serious trouble and faced possible annihilation.