The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 182 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
flanking the highway. The DRA failed to recapture any of his outposts
except the Owa-Tsalay post. The Owa-Tsalay post was located
on the highest peak overlooking Sarobi and provided observation of
Mujahideen groupings and artillery positions. The Owa-Tsalay outpost
changed hands several times, but we finally held it. The DRA
held the Mash'ala Base throughout the operation.
Our attack gained control of this stretch of the highway. DRA
reaction was very slow and ineffective. DRA forces in Sarobi fired
lots of artillery against my attacking force while their aircraft
bombed suspected Mujahideen positions on the rocky ridges south
and southwest of the gorge. DRA and Soviet helicopter gunships
were not very effective since they did not dare fly low through the
gorge or fly close to our positions. The DRA made no attempt to
outflank NIFA positions from Sarobi or from the eastern mouth of the
gorge at Mash'ala base. They also made no attempt to use heliborne
troops to cut our supply and withdrawal routes.
From October 25 through the end of the operation, the enemy
concentrated its efforts on building up forces at the two entrances
of the gorge and continuously tried to demolish our roadblocks
and regain control of the gorge section of highway. The DRA
launched frontal attacks using infantry supported by tanks moving
from the Mash'ala base in the east and from Sarobi in the west.
The DRA reinforced the beleaguered Mash'ala base with elements of
the 11th DRA Division which had been operating in Alingar District
of Laghman Province.
The DRA build-up from Laghman and Jalalabad was possible
because Mujahideen groups from Nangrahar Province (task forces
Hurricane, Gulf and Falcon) withdrew a week after overrunning their
assigned objectives. The DRA had moved reinforcements and
launched attacks in Nanagahar Province and the Mujahideen from
that area left to defend their homes. Consequently the DRA was
able to push more troops into the gorge from the east in an
attempt to break through the main obstacles (between Dargo and
Debili). From 25 through 31 October, the DRA launched several
unsuccessful attempts to open the road and suffered losses in men
and vehicles.
As the task forces Falcon, Gulf and Hurricane withdrew from
their sectors, two mechanized columns of DRA moved into the area
from two directions. Elements of 8th DRA Division, reinforced with
Soviet elements, moved east from Kabul to Sarobi and tried to open
the highway. Another column moved west from Jalalabad trying to