The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Chapter 6, Vignette 4 Page 163 river could not be forded by vehicles and he did not try using infantry in assault boats to cross at another point to outflank us. Probably the number of Mujahideen who had come to the fight on both sides of the river discouraged the enemy from risking • an infantry assault crossing at night. On the morning of 1 November, the enemy resumed heavy artillery fire and air attacks. At the same time, we detected enemy activity toward the south. Around 1000 hours, the enemy facing the bridge began to break contact. Most of their troops headed south across the plain on the southern bank of the Panjsher river. We later found out that the enemy built an engineer bridge across the river near Shokhi, some 20 kilometers down stream and crossed there to move against Nejrao and Tagao Districts. Seeing the enemy withdraw, we left our positions and collected what the enemy had left behind. The next day, we pushed their disabled tanks and APCs off the bridge into the river. COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA force did not lead with reconnaissance, nor did it use forward detachments to seize potential chokepoints before it moved. The Soviet/DRA force was evidently surprised by the strong resistance they met. Had they detected the Mujahideen road block in advance, they could have dealt with it more effectively than trying to force a crossing through repeated frontal attacks. The Soviet/DRA force had several options besides frontal attacks. First, they could have moved DRA forces from Jabul-e Seraj and Gulbahar in the north to attack the Mujahideen positions from the flank and rear since these forces were already garrisoned across the river. Second, they could have conducted an infantry assault crossing at an unopposed site and then attacked the Mujahideen position from the flank. Third, if speed was essential, the planners could have selected the option it was later forced to choose after sustaining losses and losing much time at the Abdullah-e Burj bridge. Once delayed by a strong Mujahideen resistance, the Soviet/DRA columns acted very slowly to try to seize the initiative. Tanks were ineffective in forcing the bridge. The Soviet/DRA force needed to use well-trained infantry to seize the dominant Kuh-e Top Mountain quickly. This mountain was on their side of the river and would facilitate forcing the bridge. By allowing the column to stall in a Mujahideen area, the Soviet/DRA force became vulnerable to flank and rear attacks by local Mujahideen. Quick, decisive action is key to the survival of a stalled, surrounded force.
Page 164 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Mujahideen secrecy while planning and implementing the road block was commendable. The local commanders coordinated their actions and the force fought staunchly. Their well-prepared defensive positions allowed them to survive artillery fire and air bombardment. The Mujahideen had the advantage of fighting on home turf with local support. Had the Mujahideen developed a more effective system of operational cooperation and coordination, the enemy column might not have succeeded in reaching Nejrao and Tagao. Lack of a viable operational command and control system prevented the Mujahideen at Abdullah-e Burj, Shokhi, Nejrao and Tagao from acting together. A more elaborate operational coordination could have mobilized the Mujahideen forces at Shokhi to prevent the Soviet/DRA troops from crossing the river to Kapisa Province.
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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN: Muj
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Chapter 3: Vignette Vignette Chapte
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Chapter 14: Urban Combat 365 Vignet
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FOREWORD When the Soviet Union inva
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book would not
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PREFACE Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic
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system, an oppressive central gover
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each other than trying to establish
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through various Afghan political fa
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Academy and Army Staff College. His
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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN: Muj
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194. 047. ▪ .•••" ElRAREZ S
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500 0 500 KM Del KHWAJA U N L AL L
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—Er sa) CD CD -1=•• CD CD 0 C
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VIGNETTE 15 AMBUSH AT QAFUS TANGAY
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VIGNETTE 16 SISAY AMBUSH by Command
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VIGNETTE 3 RAID ON BAGRAMI DISTRICT
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-4— KABUL 12 K MILITARY ACADEM KA
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CHAPTER 3 SHELLING ATTACKS Mujahide
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VIGNETTE 1 A SHELLING ATTACK TURNS
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Page 207 and 208: COIVIMENTARY: The confident command
Page 211 and 212: CHAPTER 7 SIEGE WARFARE The Mujahid
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CHAPTER 9 FIGHTING HELIBORNE INSERT
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VIGNETTE 1 SOVIET HELIBORNE RAID AC
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VIGNETTE 2 SOVIET RAID ON KANDA by
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Mazer-e 1111 0 t Sharif Herat CHAPT
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VIGNETTE 1 BATTLE OF BARAKI BARAK b
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VIGNETTE 2 DEFENDING AGAINST AN OFF
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VIGNETTE 3 BATTLE FOR KAMA by Abdul
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VIGNETTE 4 DEFENDING AGAINST A CORD
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VIGNETTE 5 LAST STAND ON THE ISLAND
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CHAPTER 11 DEFENDING BASE CAMPS Alt
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VIGNETTE 1 SOVIET OFFENSIVE THROUGH
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VIGNETTE 2 DEFENDING SURKHAB BASE C
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VIGNETTE 4 Loss OF THE TOR GHAR BAS
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AN UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE Chapter 11,
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VIGNETTE 6 QALA-E NAW BASE CAMP DEF
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VIGNETTE 7 DEFENDING THE SUBURBS OF
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VIGNETTE 9 BATTLE FOR CHAHARQULBA V
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VIGNETTE 10 ZHAWAR ONE by Lieutenan
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VIGNETTE 11 ZHAWAR Two by Lieutenan
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VIGNETTE 12 KRER ONE by Commander A
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VIGNETTE 1 3 KRER Two by Commander
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VIGNETTE 14 THE FALL OF CHAGHNI BAS
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CHAPTER 12 COUNTERAMBUSH Counteramb
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VIGNETTE 1 CAUGHT IN A SOVIET AMBUS
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VIGNETTE 2 AMBUSHED AT FARZA by Com
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VIGNETTE 3 BLASTING OUT OF AN AMBUS
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CHAPTER 13 ENCIRCLEMENT The Soviets
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VIGNETTE 2 THE BATTLE FOR MUSA OALE
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VIGNETTE 1 KIDNAPING A SOVIET ADVIS
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VIGNETTE 2 FOUR URBAN BOMB ATTACKS
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VIGNETTE 7 ALCOHOL CAN BE DEADLY by
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Vignette 14 Raid on 15 Division Gar
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CHAPTER 15 CONCLUSION "As a nation,
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Chapter 15 Page 401 Disunity of Com
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Chapter 15 Page 403 ing the large a
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Chapter 15 Page 405 The overall Muj
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GLOSSARY Afghanistan National Liber
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Glossary Page 409 Korean War. It sa
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Glossary Page 411 Kochi—Kochi are
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Glossary Page 413 Shia—The minori
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\c/ AGS-17 Recoiless Rifle Mortar M
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INDEX Abdul-Rahman, Mawlawi 167, 16
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Razek, Abdul 335 Index Page 419 Sad
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The Other Side of the Mountain: Muj
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