The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 260 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
after sunrise, opposing infantry, backed by tanks and BMPs, launched
the attack. The attacking columns moved confidently, assuming that
the artillery fire and air strikes had destroyed the Mujahideen resistance.
However, as they came within range, Mujahideen anti-tank
weapons and machine guns opened up. They caught the attackers by
surprise and forced the infantry and tanks to fall back. The attackers
were not very aggressive, probably as a result of their fear of mines
and anti-tank weapons.
During the first two days, the Soviets repeated their attack several
times following the same scenario: artillery fire and air strikes
would hammer Mujahideen positions. Then the infantry and tanks
would advance until they were stopped with withering fire at close
quarter. They would then fall back. The tanks that were following the
infantry were very slow to advance, particularly when some tanks
were hit and the infantry suffered casualties. At the same time, the
infantry would lose heart after being hit by withering defensive fire
and would fall back to take cover behind the tanks.
As the operation continued, two factors worked against the
Mujahideen. First, the enemy penetrated Mujahideen positions to considerable
depth on some axes. This raised the fear of being encircled
by flanking units. Second, as the Mujahideen began to understand the
scope and intent of the enemy operation, they began to escape out of
the enemy cordon. This weakened the Mujahideen positions and aided
the attacker. Some adjacent units left their forward positions at the
Qala-e Belend sector and fell back. This forced Haji Abdul Qader to
withdraw his force on the third day to his planned second line of
defense on high ground about one kilometer north of the forward
defensive positions. For the next three days, the Soviets tried to break
through Qader's positions on the high ground. It was even tougher
going for them. They used the same method of assault with the
infantry leading and the tanks following—and with the same results.
Toward the end of the week, hundreds of Mujahideen used the
Qala-e Beland sector as an escape route to their mountain bases in
Koh-e Safi in the south. The Mujahideen used a covered irrigation
canal to sneak out of the area. Just north of the road near the Qala-e
Naw bazaar, there is an east-west irrigation canal. Several northsouth
feeder canals intersect this main canal. At several points, the
canal is bridged and covered to allow vehicles to cross. At these points,
the main and feeder canals are covered. In winter, the irrigation system
is dry and provided suitable escape passages. During the last
nights of the operation, hundreds of Mujahideen escaped through the