The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 185
COMMENTARY: OPERATION ARROW was one of the few thoroughlyplanned
and fairly well-coordinated large4cale operations conducted
by the Mujahideen. The command and staff and the Mujahideen
combatants showed a high level of combat capability and resoluteness
during the action. It was a complex, daring undertaking which
achieved an ambitious goal. Considering the number of combatants,
the time spent for preparation (two-three months according to
General Wardak), the complexity of the planning, the amount of
supplies needed to be moved to the battle area—mostly all the way
from Pakistan across three provinces (Paktia, Logar, Nangrahar)—
and the results achieved, it appears that OPERATION ARROW was an
expensive and not very cost-effective venture.
OPERATION ARROW was driven more by political than military considerations.
The Soviet Union was withdrawing from Afghanistan
and, by this time, over half of the Soviet forces had already left.
People expected the DRA to rapidly crumble once the Soviets were
gone. The various political factions of the Mujahideen were jockeying
for position in the post-communist government of Afghanistan. In
order to maintain the interest and financial support of their Arab and
Western backers, the Mujahideen had to demonstrate their ability to
work together militarily—a cooperation that had been lacking
(except, to some extent, in the fighting around Kandahar) throughout
the war. This need for a show of military/political cooperation was
one of the key factors in planning and conducting such a large-scale
operation in this guerrilla war. OPERATION ARROW was a success and
boosted Mujahideen prestige and particularly promoted the lagging
image of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), which
enjoyed the greatest military success during the operation.
Militarily, the resources could have been better used by substituting
a series of smaller actions (conducted successively by groups of
about 50-70 Mujahideen at a time) at different points along the
highway. These actions would each last for a few days over an
extended period of time. Such an option, although not very spectacular,
would effectively block the highway for a longer period of time
than during OPERATION ARROW. The DRA losses would not have been
spectacular each time but should have ended with higher over-all
losses. While NIFA could afford to launch an "Arrow"-sized operation
once a year, it could conduct several similar actions of smaller size
with the same or less cost in men, material, time and other resources.
The political requirement to employ the forces of four Mujahideen
factions to close the Kabul-Jalalabad highway for two weeks each