The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 64 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
armed with the mortars. It established firing positions across the
Wardak River. The firing sites were screened from observation by
Khadibooch hill
We occupied our prepared positions in the dark. At about 0900
hours, the forward security element of the Soviet convoy drove into the
kill zone from the north. There were two BMPs and another APC in
the forward security element. We let them pass. The forward security
element just cleared the kill zone and then stopped. They must have
assumed that the way was safe, since they then signaled the main body
of the convoy to proceed. The forward security element waited while
the main body, consisting of GAZ-66 trucks and armored vehicles,
moved out of the green zone south of Shekhabad village and into the
kill zone. As the column moved into the kill zone, we opened up on the
forward security element with our anti-tank weapons. We destroyed
both BMPs and the other APC. Then we shifted our fire to the main
convoy. The fighting lasted for two hours. The enemy returned fire
from his APCs and other armored vehicles, but their fire had limited
effect against our well-prepared positions. We punished the enemy
severely with our anti-tank fire and mortar fire. The enemy did little
to change the situation or to try to gain the initiative. They merely
returned fire and those caught in the kill zone died there. I commanded
the first team of the assault group. By 1100 hours, we had
destroyed all the vehicles in the kill zone and we swarmed into the
area to capture whatever weapons and equipment we could carry.
Then we withdrew. We left 17 armored vehicles and 45 GAZ-66 trucks
and gas tankers burning in the kill zone. We captured four AK-74
assault rifles—the exclusive weapon of the Soviet forces. Mujahideen
casualties were 10 KIA and two WIA.
COMNIENTARY: Thorough planning, good intelligence, detailed instructions
to the combat elements and a simple task organization all contributed
to the success of the ambush. The heavily-armed Mujahideen
were well-disciplined and controlled. They inflicted maximum losses
on the Soviet column before moving forward to loot. This was very
effective since it maximized their advantage of fighting from well-protected
positions against an enemy caught by surprise and trapped in
the open. Perhaps the ambush should have had four elements. The
support group had a combat mission (machine gun support to the
assault group and a logistics mission of ammunition resupply and medical
evacuation). Perhaps these missions should have assigned to different
groups. Further, the heavy weapons group needed more men.