The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 392 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
and getting rid of the sentries. We exited the guard room carrying our
jerry cans of gasoline. We planned to burn down the telephone
exchange and surrounding compound. As we entered the main telephone
exchange building, the guard who was sleeping inside woke up.
As we were climbing the stairs to the second floor, he took his
Kalashnikov and began shooting. He killed Mohammad Nabi from
Chardewahl and Sherandam. He wounded Ghulam Reza. Things
became very chaotic at that point. We were firing in all directions and
other people were firing back. No one knew what was going on. We
grabbed nine Kalashnikovs and our dead and wounded and left. In our
haste, we did not set anything on fire. We retraced our steps and
reached Kalacha-e Mirza Mohammad Khan about 0230 in the morning.
The next day, we learned that we killed four DRA soldiers plus
some of their relatives who were staying there with them.
CO1VIIVIENTARY: The Mujahideen had a good movement plan through
the city, but no plan for action once they were inside the compound.
Consequently, there was no rehearsal before the raid. The commander
left the critical inside plan to the collaborator—which is not always a
good idea. In effect, the commander surrendered his command to an
outsider at the critical phase of the raid. The raiding force spent 35
minutes all together inside the guard house. This is very risky. The
concentrated raiding force was very vulnerable in case the collaborator
had not really turned. Further, sleepers don't always sleep throughout
the night and guard houses get a lot of visitors. The raiders needed a
covering force inside the compound. Maybe there was no other way to
neutralize the other sentries, but this was high risk to the raiding
party. The collaborator should have known about the sentry inside the
telephone exchange, but apparently made no plan to silence him before
the force entered the building. A raiding force needs to get in and out
in a hurry Since the commander had abrogated his command for the
critical phase, when things went bad, everyone acted on his own. The
Mujahideen evacuation of dead and wounded and their capture of
enemy weapons is commendable, but no one took 30 seconds to spill
some gasoline and light a match. The main objective was to torch the
exchange—and that did not happen.