The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 1, Vignette 11 Page 47
and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zone
would drive out of it. The security detail followed this SOP. Instead of
aggressive efforts to use their armored strength and fire power to
outflank the ambush groups and cut off their withdrawal, the Soviet
security vehicles passively remained with the embattled column and
fired on suspected Mujahideen positions. They had little effect.
Later on, as the Soviet forces established stationary security posts
in the key areas along the highway, they failed to support and sustain
them in the face of constant Mujahideen attacks. This later led them
to construct a bypass road further to the north away from the dangerous
green zone. The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement
control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most
of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerilla war, the
loss of initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of tactical combat.
What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy
losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement
and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed
information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement
and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to the ambush site.
Simultaneous attack on the enemy column along its entire depth was
perhaps the most decisive element in this ambush. In this case, the
Mujahideen had approximately 40 combatants to a kilometer of
ambush. This was much denser than usual Mujahideen ambushes and
reflected that they were fighting from a green zone which could accomodate
more combatants.
However, the Mujahideen failed to exploit the initiative they
achieved through surprise by moving to the road to complete the
destruction of a demoralized and panicked enemy. Instead, they
pulled out immediately after their success. This failure to fully exploit
an ambush became a hallmark of Mujahideen hit and run tactics
throughout the war.
Later fighting confirms the importance of field fortifications and
terrain to increase battlefield survivability and sustain combat despite
enemy air and artillery superiority. This was a lesson once learned by
the Mujahideen that was effectively implemented throughout the war.
The Soviets and DRA, on the other hand, did not make a concerted
effort to find and destroy these positions.
The parochial nature of the resistance always affected selection of
the place and time of tactical actions against the enemy. In areas
where the local population remained in their homes and had not emigrated,
local resistance units preferred to reserve for themselves the