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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Page 266 <strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mountain</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> Tactics in <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Afghan War<br />

CHAPTER COMMENTARY<br />

<strong>The</strong> Soviet/DRA cordon and search usually involved a number <strong>of</strong><br />

forces in a combined arms battle or operation. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> who<br />

had <strong>the</strong> best success surviving <strong>the</strong>se did so because <strong>the</strong>ir actions<br />

were centrally coordinated, <strong>the</strong>y had developed contingency plans to<br />

deal with <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong>y had built redundant field fortifications to<br />

slow <strong>the</strong> Soviet/DRA advance and fragment <strong>the</strong>ir efforts. <strong>The</strong> betterprepared<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> always retained a central reserve and were<br />

adept at counterattacking <strong>the</strong> flanks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attacker. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

who had <strong>the</strong> most difficulty with cordon and search operations<br />

were usually separate groups who had little or no ties to a central<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> planning authority, had worked out no contingency<br />

plans and had taken no steps to fortify <strong>the</strong> area.

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