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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Page 44 <strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mountain</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> Tactics in <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Afghan War<br />

brought from Shindand. Shindand was supplied with gasoline from<br />

a Soviet-built field pipeline.<br />

Saranwal Abdul Wali <strong>of</strong> NIFA and I coordinated <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

plan. We planned to position several interconnected ambushes,<br />

manned by small groups <strong>of</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>, to surprise and take <strong>the</strong><br />

entire length <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column under simultaneous fire. This required<br />

selection <strong>of</strong> a favorable stretch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> road that could accommodate<br />

all <strong>the</strong> ambushes required to attack <strong>the</strong> entire column. We selected a<br />

stretch <strong>of</strong> nearly seven kilometers between a point at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong><br />

Sanjari (<strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> Ashoqa villages) and a point immediately to<br />

<strong>the</strong> east <strong>of</strong> Pashmol as <strong>the</strong> killing zone for <strong>the</strong> enemy column. We estimated<br />

that this stretch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highway corresponded to <strong>the</strong> length <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> enemy column.<br />

We decided to divide <strong>the</strong> 250 available <strong>Mujahideen</strong> into several<br />

groups. <strong>The</strong> groups were armed with RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers<br />

and four-to-five 82mm recoilless rifles. All ambushes were sited in<br />

<strong>the</strong> green zone to <strong>the</strong> south <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> road. Each ambush group had an<br />

assigned sector <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> kill zone. All groups were instructed to open fire<br />

simultaneously as <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column reaches <strong>the</strong> Ashoqa villages.<br />

It was expected that at that time <strong>the</strong> tail <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column would have just<br />

cleared <strong>the</strong> Pashmol villages.<br />

At that time, most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local population still lived in <strong>the</strong>ir homes<br />

along <strong>the</strong> road. Few had migrated to Pakistan since no major Soviet<br />

military actions had taken place <strong>the</strong>re. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups coming<br />

from Malajat (<strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn and southwestern suburbs <strong>of</strong> Kandahar)<br />

and o<strong>the</strong>r neighboring bases moved during <strong>the</strong> night to <strong>the</strong>ir designated<br />

ambush sites. <strong>The</strong> ambush plan was kept secret from <strong>the</strong> local<br />

population and local <strong>Mujahideen</strong> units since resistance groups based<br />

in <strong>the</strong> ambush area were reluctant to participate, fearing retaliation<br />

directed at <strong>the</strong>ir homes and families still living <strong>the</strong>re.<br />

<strong>The</strong> ambush groups moved into position during <strong>the</strong> night and<br />

deployed patrols to secure <strong>the</strong> area. As <strong>the</strong> day began and locals<br />

started moving around, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> patrols temporarily detained<br />

<strong>the</strong> villagers to ensure secrecy. <strong>The</strong> Soviet convoy reached <strong>the</strong> kill<br />

zone at 0900 hours. As instructed, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups opened<br />

fire simultaneously, surprising <strong>the</strong> enemy. <strong>The</strong> column stopped and<br />

many vehicles began moving north onto <strong>the</strong> open plain. <strong>The</strong> escorting<br />

tanks and APCs fired randomly in panic from on <strong>the</strong> road<br />

without trying to maneuver or close with <strong>the</strong> ambush sites. Enemy<br />

vehicles moving north <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> highway soon were out <strong>of</strong> range <strong>of</strong><br />

many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> weapons.

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