The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 200 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
guns were positioned in the towers which made it impossible for the
Mujahideen to approach close to the fort. This prevented the
Mujahideen from tightening their seige on the fort.
A few days after the seige began, the religious Festival of Sacrifice
(Eid-al-Adha) occured. It was customary for Mujahideen to go home
during the festival and the enemy felt that few Mujahideen would still
be around. This time, however, we did not let our people go home but
kept them at their bases. Thinking that the Mujahideen were not a
threat, the DRA took advantage of the holiday and sent three tanks
and a few trucks from the main regimental base to resupply the
battalion. We put an ambush force of approximately 70 Mujahideen,
commanded by Mawlawi Hasan, in a dry stream bed about halfway
between the two forts. Among their weapons were some RPG-7s.
When the DRA column entered the kill zone, he sprang the ambush.
The ambush destroyed one tank and damaged another. The ambushers
killed some DRA soldiers and captured 25. Some others escaped.
The DRA abandoned one intact tank, but the Mujahideen could not
retrieve it due to heavy machine gun fire from the battalion's fort.
The fire forced the Mujahideen force back into a side canyon. When
night fell, Mawlawi Hasan and Khan Zamak led a group of
Mujahideen back to the intact tank. The Mujahideen group included
some former DRA tank crewmen. They drove the tank away to their
position.
We planned to attack the battalion fort three days later, using
the tank as the main weapon. We formed an 11-man tank protection
group and mounted them on the tank. They were armed with some
RPGs and small arms. They would ride the tank during a night
advance through the antipersonnel minefield that surrounded the
fort. In case the tank got stuck, the tank protection group would
protect the tank and free it. A 65-man assault force would follow in
the tracks of the tank as it passed throught the minefield. The tank
crew would blow a hole in the wall of the fort using the main gun
of the tank. The 11-man tank protection crew would then dismount
and secure the hole opening and the 65-man assault team would
enter the fort. Mujahideen communications personnel would also
help in the assault by interrupting the communications between
the battalion and regiment. When possible, the radio operators
would misdirect the artillery. 1
1 It was common practice for Mujahideen and DRA to enter each others radio nets for
deception, harassment or to pass messages. General Gulzarak would often talk to the
other side and curse and insult them.