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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 7<br />

RAID ON MAHIPAR OUTPOSTS<br />

by Commander Wazir Gul<br />

In July 1984 three groups <strong>of</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> combined to raid<br />

Soviet/DRA security outposts on <strong>the</strong> main Kabul-Jalalabad highway.<br />

(Map 2-6 - Mahipar) Highway 1 at Mahipar passes through a deep<br />

gorge, with <strong>the</strong> river flowing immediately to <strong>the</strong> north <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> road<br />

and with a steep ridge rising on <strong>the</strong> south. <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> than <strong>the</strong> highway,<br />

<strong>the</strong> main access to Mahipar is through Mulla Omar Dara, a mountain<br />

valley connecting Mulla Omar Village with Highway 1. At that<br />

time, <strong>the</strong> DRA had a militia unit headquartered at Mulla Omar. <strong>The</strong><br />

DRA militia commander was Hasan Khan Karokhel, <strong>the</strong> local<br />

Ghilzai Pashtun chieftain. Hasan Khan was also a secret collaborator<br />

with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>. He helped facilitate our movements and<br />

combat against Soviet/DRA forces in <strong>the</strong> area.<br />

My group reached Mulla Omar in <strong>the</strong> evening after a day march<br />

from our base at Tangi Tezin. <strong>The</strong>re, we were joined by two NIFA<br />

commanders, Captain Afghan <strong>of</strong> Deh Sabz, and Sayed Hasan Khan <strong>of</strong><br />

Khak-e Jabar. All toge<strong>the</strong>r, we had 80 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> armed with AK-47s<br />

and .303 Enfield rifles, five BM-ls, four 82mm recoilless rifles, four<br />

82mm mortars, two DShKs and 13 RPG-7s. We planned our combined<br />

action at Mulla Omar and moved out <strong>the</strong> next morning toward<br />

Mahipar over Lataband mountain. We had packed our heavy weapons<br />

on mules. <strong>The</strong>re were three chief components in our combined force—<br />

two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group<br />

had BM-1s and 82mm mortars. <strong>The</strong>ir mission was to attack and pin<br />

down <strong>the</strong> DRA base on <strong>the</strong> left flank and <strong>the</strong> Soviet base on <strong>the</strong> right<br />

flank. <strong>The</strong> assault group consisted <strong>of</strong> three teams. Each assault team<br />

had a designated outpost to attack. Each assault team had RPGs and<br />

recoilless rifles to support <strong>the</strong>ir attack.<br />

In order to minimize <strong>the</strong> daylight available to <strong>the</strong> enemy's aircraft,<br />

we began our attack at 1600. We knew it would take several hours for<br />

<strong>the</strong>m to respond. Our heavy weapons pounded <strong>the</strong> flanking bases to<br />

isolate <strong>the</strong> attack area. <strong>The</strong> assault teams began to fire on <strong>the</strong> security<br />

posts and slowly move forward. <strong>The</strong> attack on <strong>the</strong> security posts<br />

was hindered by enemy mines and it took several hours for <strong>the</strong><br />

Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) <strong>of</strong> Burhanuddin<br />

Rabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest <strong>of</strong> Sarobi. He fought in <strong>the</strong> Sarobi, Lataband<br />

and Mahipar areas. [Map sheet 2986, vic grid 4723].

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