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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Page 16 <strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mountain</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> Tactics in <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Afghan War<br />

Depending on initial vehicle interval and <strong>the</strong> commander's ability to<br />

stop <strong>the</strong> convoy from bunching up, some 70 to 150 vehicles may have<br />

been caught in <strong>the</strong> three-kilometer gorge. <strong>The</strong> drivers were dependent<br />

on firepower to rescue <strong>the</strong>m, but <strong>the</strong> convoy was unable to bring firepower<br />

to bear to save <strong>the</strong>ir column.<br />

Helicopters have an important role in convoy security, not only as<br />

scouts, but as a rapid reaction force and as a lift force to move security<br />

elements from one piece <strong>of</strong> dominant high ground to <strong>the</strong> next. <strong>The</strong><br />

lack <strong>of</strong> helicopters deprived <strong>the</strong> convoy <strong>of</strong> needed warning and firepower.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> needed radios and early warning pickets to alert<br />

ambush forces about <strong>the</strong> approach <strong>of</strong> convoys and aircraft. At this<br />

point <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war, few <strong>Mujahideen</strong> had tactical radio communications

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