The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 102 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
I directed three men to , move quietly to the post, jump over the wall
and attack the sentry. Then, as soon as the other soldiers started to
come out of the guard house, we would rush the guard house and
demand their surrender.
I positioned the RPG-7 where it could hit the guard house and told
the gunner not to fire if he heard his comrades telling the soldiers to
surrender (surrender was the code word). I instructed him to open fire
if the enemy initiated contact and opened fire on us.
At about 0100, my three-men party approached the outpost. One
man covered the team while the other two jumped over the wall. One
of these Mujahideen landed squarely on the back of the sleeping enemy
sentry. The sentry was wrapped in a blanket and sound asleep, but
when my Mujahideen landed on him, he woke up and began to shout.
My panicked Mujahideen opened fire and killed the sentry.
Anticipating the reaction of the guards, one Mujahideen tossed a hand
grenade into the door of the guard room. As it exploded, they rushed
into the structure. My RPG gunner heard the commotion, but did not
hear his comrades demanding the enemy surrender. Since the code
word was not used, my RPG gunner assumed that the enemy had overwhelmed
his comrades and therefore opened fire on the guard house.
The RPG-7 rocket ripped through the wall of the guard house,
killing two soldiers and seriously injuring one of my Mujahideen standing
nearby. This changed the situation drastically. My wounded
Mujahideen was calling for help and his comrades stopped to evacuate
him. As soon as my other Mujahideen saw their comrades stop to
attend to their fallen comrade, they also stopped their attack. I called
off the raid and ordered a withdrawal. As we withdrew, my security
teams rejoined us and we returned to our base.
C0MMENFARY: The Mujahideen timing for the raid was ideal.
Inclement weather and night movement covered their approach. The
enemy guard was even asleep. This lack of enemy alertness was not
unusual. The DRA and Soviets usually failed to deploy foot patrols at
night between their outposts. There was also little tactical and fire
coordination between outposts. This passivity at night resulted in a
bunker mentality among the Soviet/DRA soldiers manning isolated
security outposts and allowed the Mujahideen freedom of movement
and the chance to own the night and conduct their hit and run raids.
Lack of control of the raiding party at the objective foiled an otherwise
skillfully -planned action. What went wrong was a combination of
Murphy's law, a lack of precombat rehearsals and a lack of a regular